<?xml version="1.0"?><rss xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" version="2.0"><channel><title>Mercatus Research Area</title><link>http://mercatus.org/RSS.aspx?Category=186</link><description>This is Research Areas RSS from Mercatus.Org</description><item><title>The National Insurance Consumer Protection Act’s Potential Impact on the Social Resiliency of Hazard-Prone Regions</title><link>http://mercatus.org/PublicationDetails.aspx?id=27464</link><description>
&lt;p&gt;The ability of communities to recover from disasters depends on a well-functioning property insurance market.  However, many states insurance markets are substantially distorted or are hobbled by excessive regulation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As a solution, there has been proposed an Optional Federal Charter (OFC) system, under which insurers would be able to opt into a federal regulatory system, leaving behind the system of patchwork state regulations.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
The merits of moving toward federal regulation have been debated for many years to try and alleviate some of the problems of current regulatory systems. The most common model in recent years is the Optional Federal Charter (OFC). This approach would provide insurers the option of obtaining either a state or a federal charter.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
This paper discusses the benefits and problems with both the state-based and federal-based regulatory systems and suggests that, if policy makers choose to proceed with an Optional Federal Charter system, they should focus attention on:&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
1.       Minimizing political risk,&lt;br /&gt;
2.       Allowing competitive rating and minimizing rate suppression,&lt;br /&gt;
3.       Minimizing the immediate impact on policy holders, and&lt;br /&gt;
4.       Maintaining the antitrust exemption.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>David C. Marlett</author><pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2009 18:49:42 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>The Long Road Back: Signal Noise in the Post-Katrina Context - Working Paper</title><link>http://mercatus.org/PublicationDetails.aspx?id=27640</link><description>
&lt;p&gt;On August 29, 2005, the nation watched as Hurricane Katrina pummeled the Gulf Coast, inflicting more than $100 billion of property damage across broad swaths of Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, and Alabama and ultimately claiming more than 1,600 lives.  In the wake of this catastrophic destruction, hopeful signs of community resilience appeared. Within days of the storm, many residents along the Mississippi Gulf Coast had come home and begun to rebuild. Soon after floodwaters had receded from devastated St. Bernard Parish, district officials announced they would reopen a school by November 14 and pledged to serve any child who returned to the community. In New Orleans East, members of the Vietnamese-American community organized to gut, clean, and restore their homes and businesses, despite being told by city officials that it was unlikely they would be allowed to rebuild. Impressive as these and other efforts were, however, one cannot help but ask why, despite the community resilience visible in some areas, the overall pace of recovery has been so desperately slow.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>Emily Chamlee-Wright</author><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2009 14:10:17 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Reversing a Rising Tide: Goals for Reforming the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association</title><link>http://mercatus.org/PublicationDetails.aspx?id=27008</link><description>
&lt;p&gt;Designed to be insurers of last resort, state residual markets are now the largest insurers in many coastal areas. One such organization, the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association (TWIA), is one of seven staterun residual market mechanisms for hurricane wind coverage. The two hurricanes which struck Texas in 2008 cost TWIA almost $3 billion and revealed the association’s unsound financial basis and desperate need for reform.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>Daniel Sutter</author><pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2009 20:32:02 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Private Solutions to Public Disasters: Self-Reliance and Social Resilience</title><link>http://mercatus.org/PublicationDetails.aspx?id=27702</link><description>
&lt;p&gt;Profit-seeking entrepreneurs are vital to any recovery process.  Entrepreneurs must be able to unrestrictedly allocate land and labor resources to their most urgent employments, as expressed by customers through prices. Any interference with the structure of prices distorts the signals that entrepreneurs receive, misdirecting or hampering their efforts.  Misallocation of resources can literally be a matter of life and death in the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster or war.  Price ceilings dampen the ability of profits to induce increased supply of needed goods and services, and distort the ability of prices to signal consumers to ration and economize scarce resources.  Poor policy unnecessarily blocks and inhibits the labor and capital adjustments necessary for a complete and timely recovery by distorting entrepreneurial calculation and preventing entrepreneurs from allocating resources to their most productive uses.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Despite having their plans frustrated through the regulations and uncertainty created by government action, humankind has still demonstrated a remarkable resilience following a natural or manmade disaster.  We argue that this is due to the civilizing and coordinating roles played by civil society.  For-profit companies, charities and churches play a vital role in the recovery process.  These organizations have proven to be the first, and most well equipped responders to disasters, jump starting the recovery process.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>Daniel J. Smith, Peter Boettke</author><pubDate>Tue, 28 Jul 2009 20:25:06 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Policy Uncertainty and the Market for Wind Insurance</title><link>http://mercatus.org/PublicationDetails.aspx?id=27434</link><description>
Since Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast in 2005, critics have suggested that rising homeowners insurance costs in some areas are due to market inefficiency or herding behavior by insurers. Alternatively, insurers could be reducing exposure to hurricane losses due to new information or because of uncertainty due to enacted or contemplated regulatory or policy actions.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
Herding behavior creates a policy rationale for public insurers of last resort or policies to prevent panicked exit by insurers after hurricanes. This paper tests the herding thesis empirically and finds that, while many insurers have raised premia since 2005, there is little evidence of herding behavior. Uncertainty in regulation and public policy are likely the significant drivers of rising costs and decreased availability rather than irrational herding by insurers. Policy implications of this finding are discussed.
</description><author>Daniel Sutter</author><pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2009 19:13:25 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Occupational Licensing and Asymmetric Information: Post-Hurricane Evidence from Florida</title><link>http://mercatus.org/PublicationDetails.aspx?id=27294</link><description>
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj28n1/cj28n1-5.pdf"&gt;Click Here for Article&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Skarbek, David. "Occupational Licensing and Asymmetric Information: Post-Hurricane Evidence from Florida." &lt;em&gt;Cato Journal&lt;/em&gt; 28, no. 1 (Winter 2008): 73-82.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Federal, state, and county governments accept the argument that occupational licensing protects consumers and improves their welfare. This argument stands in stark contrast to the apparent rent seeking that occurs with licensing. In return for gains from state-created barriers to entry, coalitions built along occupational lines support politicians.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This article will show that government action in times of crisis is often inconsistent with its rhetoric. Licensing is typically justified on the grounds that market mechanisms will not mitigate the problems associated with asymmetric information. In the wake of Hurricanes Frances and Katrina, Florida reduced restrictions on construction contractors, yet in times of crises informational asymmetries are more likely to be problematic. By examining the volume of work completed, I find little evidence of significant detrimental effects from the policy change. Given the relative success of reducing restrictions and the government's explicit recognition of licensing's limiting effect on the availability of roofers, reform of licensing, at least to the extent done in crisis, should be adopted permanently.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>David B. Skarbek</author><pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2009 21:12:43 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Market Failure and Natural Disasters: A Reexamination of Anti-Gouging Laws</title><link>http://mercatus.org/PublicationDetails.aspx?id=27650</link><description>
&lt;p&gt;David B. Skarbek 2008-08-15 206:Journal Articles This article will show that government action in times of crisis is often inconsistent with its rhetoric. Licensing is typically justified on the grounds that market mechanisms will not mitigate the problems associated with asymmetric information. In&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>David B. Skarbek</author><pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2009 15:53:40 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Local Knowledge: Caring Communities: The Role of Nonprofits in Rebuilding the Gulf Coast</title><link>http://mercatus.org/PublicationDetails.aspx?id=27958</link><description>
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a title="Visit our multimedia publication of Local Knowledge." href="http://localknowledge.mercatus.org/"&gt;Visit our multimedia publication of &lt;strong&gt;&lt;em&gt;Local Knowledge: Caring Communities&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The idea of "social entrepreneurship"-innovation in the philanthropic sector to fill in the gaps left by both the market sector and the state sector-has become a hot topic in the last decade.  People increasingly wonder how nonprofit enterprises and social entrepreneurs can effectively mimic the successes of the market economy in increasing human welfare, choice, and dignity without either the profit-loss system of markets or the democratic and constitutional checks of the public sector.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So wide is the field of social entrepreneurship and so broad the definition that it is helpful to have a lens through which to focus the study of the area. The recovery of the Gulf Coast following the destruction wrought by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 provides such a lens.  Since 2005, researchers from the Mercatus Center at George Mason University have studied how different social, legal, political, and economic institutions affected communities before, during, and after the hurricane, with an eye to learning what works in disaster preparedness and recovery.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Across the Gulf Coast, the voices of people affected by Katrina have showed us how people acquire knowledge and how people perceive government, businesses, and community efforts. Social scientific research, based on over 450 hours of interviews with people from the Gulf Coast, is critical to better understanding how people, businesses, and communities prepare for and rebuild after disasters and the role that the for-profit, nonprofit, and public sectors play in every day social and economic interactions.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Tocqueville's observation about the American tendency to form voluntary associations holds true today. The nonprofit sector plays a vital role in a society of free and responsible individuals. The face-to-face forces of reputation and community membership not only coordinate highly effective small-scale projects that support those in need, but they provide a sense of community and identity to us all.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue of &lt;em&gt;Local Knowledge&lt;/em&gt; seeks to pay attention to and increase our understanding of the necessity and vitality of such associations and the work of social entrepreneurs in society, both in normal times and in those that are most trying.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>Daniel Rothschild, Emily Chamlee-Wright, Jennifer Zambone, Jerry Brito, Lenore Ealy, Peter Boettke, Roxanne Alvarez, Veronique de Rugy, Virgil Storr</author><pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2009 17:34:08 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Doing the Right Things: The Private Sector Response to Hurricane Katrina as a Case Study in the Bourgeois Virtues</title><link>http://mercatus.org/PublicationDetails.aspx?id=27942</link><description>
&lt;p&gt;Supposedly self-interested and profit-seeking firms engage in behavior that could only be understood in terms of putting their employees and communities ahead of their corporate selfinterest. Major American companies from Marriott to McDonald's to Wal-Mart undertook major and minor acts of bourgeois virtue and contributed in a significant way to the recovery from Hurricane Katrina. Managers and senior leaders used the language of ethics and virtue, rather than that of narrow self-interest or profit maximization, in describing what they expected from employees, and employees used similar language to describe their own behavior. "Doing the right thing" was central to their response. What constituted "doing the right thing," how the very nature of large capitalist enterprises made doing "right" possible, and how doing "right" improved conditions after Katrina is explored in this working paper.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;font size="1"&gt;&lt;u&gt;Citation (Chicago Style):&lt;/u&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;font size="1"&gt;Horwitz, Steve. "Doing the Right Things: The Private Sector Response to Hurricane Katrina as a Case Study in the Bourgeois Virtues." Working Paper, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2009.&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>Steven Horwitz</author><pubDate>Thu, 27 Aug 2009 15:15:33 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Best Responders: Post-Katrina Innovation and Improvisations by Wal-Mart and the U.S. Coast Guard</title><link>http://mercatus.org/PublicationDetails.aspx?id=27890</link><description>
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/itgg.2009.4.2.93"&gt;Click Here for Article&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The unprecedented impacts of Hurricane Katrina provide an interesting study in how organizations innovate and improvise in the face of the unexpected. Most of the attention paid to organizational performance during the disaster has focused, understandably, on the systematic failures of FEMA. But were there any successes? Yes, in fact. Two of the stand-out responders were Wal-Mart and the United States Coast Guard-one a private-sector firm, the other a part of the federal government. While these two organizations are very different, they both succeeded in the demanding environment of post-Katrina response because they had created the right internal incentives for middle managers to take initiative and the right structures of communication to allow local information to determine the nature of the response.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;u&gt;&lt;font size="1"&gt;Citation (Chicago Style)&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/u&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;font size="1"&gt;Horwitz, Steven. "Best Responders: Post-Katrina Innovation and Improvisations by Wal-Mart and the U.S. Coast Guard." &lt;em&gt;Innovations&lt;/em&gt; 4, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 93-99.&lt;/font&gt;
</description><author>Steven Horwitz</author><pubDate>Wed, 12 Aug 2009 15:10:31 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>The Crisis of Katrina: Lessons for Preparedness and Response</title><link>http://mercatus.org/EventDetails.aspx?id=16772</link><description>
&lt;h2&gt;Featuring:&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;August 29, 2006 will mark the one year anniversary of Hurricane Katrina's landfall in the U.S. Gulf Coast region. What have we learned from Katrina, and what does it mean for other communities that face disaster - natural or man-made? What is the status of the rebuilding effort? Can communities torn apart by disasters rebuild? What role should government, communities, volunteers, and businesses play during and following a disaster?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In a joint Mercatus Center/National Press Club event, scholars from the Mercatus Center at George Mason University released preliminary findings of a five-year research project analyzing these issues with commentary provided by journalists from the &lt;em&gt;National Journal&lt;/em&gt; and Pulitzer Prize winning &lt;em&gt;New Orleans Times-Picayune&lt;/em&gt;. You can watch the event on &lt;a title="CSPAN's website" href="http://www.c-span.org/homepage.asp?Cat=Current_Event&amp;amp;Code=HUR&amp;amp;ShowVidNum=17&amp;amp;Rot_Cat_CD=HUR&amp;amp;Rot_HT=&amp;amp;Rot_WD=&amp;amp;ShowVidDays=365&amp;amp;ShowVidDesc=&amp;amp;ArchiveDays=365"&gt;C-SPAN's website&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Presentations and comments by:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Dr. Eelco Dykstra, National Press Club and visiting professor of International Emergency Management at The George Washington University &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Dr. Peter Boettke, professor of economics at George Mason University and project director for "Crisis, Preparedness, and Response in the Wake of Katrina"&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Dr. Russell Sobel, James Clark Coffman Distinguished Professor of Economics at West Virginia University and author of "Weathering Corruption," and "The Economics &amp;amp; Politics of FEMA - Why FEMA Failed after Hurricane Katrina"&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Dr. Emily Chamlee-Wright, professor of economics at Beloit College and author of "After the Storm: Social Capital Regrouping in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina"&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Jonathan Rauch, guest scholar at the Brookings Institution and a senior writer and columnist for &lt;em&gt;National Journal&lt;/em&gt; and a correspondent for &lt;em&gt;The Atlantic Monthly&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;James Varney, staff writer at the Pulitzer Prize winning &lt;em&gt;New Orleans Times-Picayune&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description><author>Carrie Conko</author><pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2009 16:29:44 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>The Crisis in Public Safety Communications</title><link>http://mercatus.org/EventDetails.aspx?id=16708</link><description>
&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Exactly five years to the day before the September 11, 2001 attacks, the FCC issued a report warning that a lack of interoperability among public safety emergency communications systems was preventing emergency personnel from protecting life and property. "Rescuing victims of the [1993] World Trade Center bombing, who were caught between floors, was hindered when police officers could not communicate with firefighters on the very next floor," the report stated.  Sadly, it was precisely such interoperability problems that would prevent over 100 New York City firefighters from receiving an evacuation order on September 11&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt; before the towers collapsed. Until an improved public safety communications system is actually implemented, tragic outcomes will continue to haunt first responders to public emergencies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;The Crisis in Public Safety Communications&lt;/em&gt; brought together prominent scholars, policymakers, and industry officials to discuss solutions to this deadly serious problem. Major telecommunications scholars presented groundbreaking research on what causes the lack of effective communication between local public safety personnel, and how U.S. spectrum policies have failed to remedy this Balkanization problem.  This research was then discussed by two panels of industry executives, public safety officials, and policymakers with deep knowledge of the problems confronting us.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;font size="4"&gt;Symposium Publications:&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;**These papers will be published in an upcoming symposium edition of the Federal Communications Law Journal. Please do not quote, cite, or distribute without the permission of the author.**&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://http://mercatus.org/repository/docLib/20061211_SOLVING_THE_INTEROPERABILITY_PROBLEM_-_Faulhaber.pdf"&gt;Solving the Interoperability Problem&lt;/a&gt; - &lt;strong&gt;Gerald R. Faulhaber&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://http://mercatus.org/repository/docLib/20061211_Fundamental_Reform_in_Public_Safety_Communications_Policy_-_Peha.pdf"&gt;Fundamental Reform in Public Safety Communications Policy&lt;/a&gt; - &lt;strong&gt;Jon M. Peha&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://http://mercatus.org/repository/docLib/20061211_Communicating_After_Disasters_-_Weiser.pdf"&gt;Communicating After Disasters&lt;/a&gt; - &lt;strong&gt;Philip J. Weiser&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://http://mercatus.org/repository/docLib/20061211_SENDING_OUT_AN_S.O.S._-_Brito.pdf"&gt;Sending Out an S.O.S.&lt;/a&gt; - &lt;strong&gt;Jerry Brito&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;font size="4"&gt;PowerPoint Presentations:&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a title="CHC_Crisis_Public_Safety_Comm_Victory_pdf" href="http://http://mercatus.org/uploadedFiles/Mercatus/Events/20061211_Impact_of_Hurricane_Katrina_on_Communications_Networks_-_Victory.pdf"&gt;Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks&lt;/a&gt; - &lt;strong&gt;Nancy J. Victory&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a title="CHC_Crisis_Public_Safety_Comm_Faulhaber_PPpdf" href="http://http://mercatus.org/uploadedFiles/Mercatus/Events/200612111_solving_the_interoperability_problem_-_faulhaber.pdf"&gt;Solving the Interoperability Problem&lt;/a&gt; - &lt;strong&gt;Gerald R. Faulhaber&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a title="CHC_Crisis_Public_Safety_Comm_Peha_PPpdf" href="http://http://mercatus.org/uploadedFiles/Mercatus/Events/20061211_Fundamental_Reform_in_Public_Safety_Communications_-_Peha.pdf"&gt;Fundamental Reform in Public Safety Communications Policy&lt;/a&gt; - &lt;strong&gt;Jon M. Peha&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a title="CHC_Crisis_Public_Safety_Comm_Weiser_PPpdf" href="http://http://mercatus.org/uploadedFiles/Mercatus/Events/200612111_communicating_after_disasters_-_weiser.pdf"&gt;Communicating After Disasters&lt;/a&gt; - &lt;strong&gt;Philip J. Weiser&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;a title="CHC_Crisis_Public_Safety_Comm_Werner_paperpdf" href="http://http://mercatus.org/uploadedFiles/Mercatus/Events/20061211_Achieving_Interoperability_-_Werner.pdf"&gt;Achieving Interoperability&lt;/a&gt;&lt;strong&gt; - Charles Werner&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h1&gt;&lt;font size="5"&gt;Schedule of events:&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/h1&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;8:00 - 8:30 am:&lt;/strong&gt;  Opening address: &lt;strong&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.wrf.com/directory.cfm?attorney_ID=692"&gt;Nancy Victory&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;, Chair of FCC Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, and formerly Administrator, National Telecommunications and Information Administration.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Please&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;a href="http://content.screencast.com/?parameters=aebc4e4d-3e85-4cd6-9c90-594b377465ce_static_0_0_Opening address - Nancy Victory.wmv"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Click Here&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;strong&gt; to view the video of this presentation.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;8:30 - 10:00 am:&lt;/strong&gt; Panel I - Perspectives from the Academic Community&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Please&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;a href="http://content.screencast.com/?parameters=2ebf6778-816f-4c92-8e41-b00c18d8e91f_static_0_0_pfac.wmv"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Click Here&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;strong&gt; to view the video of this presentation.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table border="0"&gt;
&lt;tbody&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Moderator:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.law.gmu.edu/nctl/bios/hazlett.php"&gt;Dr. Tom Hazlett&lt;/a&gt;, Professor of Law and Economics,&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;
&lt;td&gt;&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td&gt; George Mason School of Law&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/tbody&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/faulhabe.html" target="_blank"&gt;Gerald Faulhaber&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;, Wharton School&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.epp.cmu.edu/httpdocs/people/bios/peha.html" target="_blank"&gt;Jon Peha&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;, Carnegie Mellon University&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.ccsc.colorado.edu/people/weiser.php" target="_blank"&gt;Phil Weiser&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;, University of Colorado&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;a title="Jerry Brito" href="http://http://mercatus.org/PeopleDetails.aspx?id=17116"&gt;Jerry Brito&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;, Mercatus Center at George Mason University&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
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&lt;tbody&gt;
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&lt;/table&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;10:00 - 10:10 am:&lt;/strong&gt; Break&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;10:10 - 11:10 am:&lt;/strong&gt; Debate - Perspectives from the Business Community&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Please&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;a href="http://content.screencast.com/?parameters=0c8f2779-9110-48bb-9042-62f46382750b_static_0_0_Business Community Debate.wmv"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Click Here&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;strong&gt; to view the video of this presentation.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.cyrencall.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;amp;task=view&amp;amp;id=16&amp;amp;Itemid=57#brien"&gt;Morgan O’Brien&lt;/a&gt;, Chairman, Cyren Call Communications&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.ctia.org/aboutCTIA/leadership_team/index.cfm" target="_blank"&gt;Chris Guttman-McCabe&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, CTIA-The Wireless Association&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;11:10 - 11:15 am:&lt;/strong&gt; Break&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;11:15 - 12:30 pm:&lt;/strong&gt; Panel III - Perspectives from the Policymaking Community&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Please&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;a href="http://content.screencast.com/?parameters=f67be708-6cab-41b4-88dc-0c8b1f39e157_static_0_0_Perspectives from the Policymaking Community.wmv"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Click Here&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;strong&gt; to view the video of this presentation.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;David Furth&lt;/strong&gt;, Associate Chief, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, FCC&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://cms.firehouse.com/content/contributor/bio.jsp?id=23" target="_blank"&gt;Charles Werner&lt;/a&gt;, Fire Chief with the City of Charlottesville, VA&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Adele Morris&lt;/strong&gt;, Economist, US Department of Treasury&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;12:30 - 1:45 pm:&lt;/strong&gt; Luncheon, with an address by &lt;strong&gt;&lt;a href="http://cms.firehouse.com/content/contributor/bio.jsp?id=23" target="_blank"&gt;Charles Werner&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;, Fire Chief with the City of Charlottesville, VA, Fire Department; Past Chair and present member of the Commonwealth of Virginia's Statewide Interoperability Executive Committee.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Please&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;a href="http://content.screencast.com/?parameters=f28e3b43-8905-4980-89a3-47eac4c86e3b_static_0_0_Luncheon address - Charles Werner.wmv"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Click Here&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;strong&gt; to view the video of this presentation.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;1:45 pm:&lt;/strong&gt; Conference Concluded&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;The Crisis in Public Safety Communications was co-sponsored by the Mercatus Center and the Information Economy Project of the National Center for Technology and Law at George Mason University.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;hr /&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;font size="1"&gt;The &lt;a title="Mercatus Center" href="http://http://mercatus.org/"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Mercatus Center&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; at George Mason University is a research center focused on improving our understanding of how societies transition to prosperity and remain prosperous over time.  The findings of that research are then communicated to decision makers in a position to act on them. Through the application of market process analysis, a uniquely George Mason approach, Mercatus researchers and the students they work with seek to bridge theory and practice to better understand how market-oriented systems enable human well being. The Mercatus Center is a 501(c)(3) tax exempt organization.&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;font size="1"&gt;The &lt;a href="http://www.law.gmu.edu/nctl/iep/index.php" target="_blank"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Information Economy Project of the National Center for Technology and Law&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; seeks to promote academic research and scholarly debate on public policy issues in the Information Economy.  These involve, among other topics, how governments regulate communications networks, the role of antitrust in software, computer chips and online services, the effect of media content controls, and how intellectual property rules are challenged by the advent of innovative technologies.&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>Kathleen O&amp;#39;Hearn</author><pubDate>Fri, 17 Oct 2008 13:42:31 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Risky Business: The Economics of Insurance Markets</title><link>http://mercatus.org/EventDetails.aspx?id=16688</link><description>
&lt;h2&gt;Featuring:&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;a title="Dr. Catherine England" href="http://cei.org/people/catherine-england"&gt;Dr. Catherine England&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;Chair of Accounting, Economics, and Finance&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;School of Business Administration, Marymount University&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a title="CHC-RiskyBusiness-England-2005" href="http://http://mercatus.org/uploadedFiles/Mercatus/Events/CHC-RiskyBusiness-England-2005.mp3"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Click Here&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;em&gt; for audio clip from archive&lt;/em&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since the passage of the 1933 Banking Act – a reaction to events stemmed by the stock market crash of 1929 – the federal government has imposed numerous regulations on the financial services industry. From laws regulating bank activities, to rules governing securities exchange, to national standards established for the accounting industry, Congress has been very active in overseeing the financial sector. However, largely left untouched in this accumulation of regulations over the last 70 years is the insurance industry.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Outside of the creation of the National Flood Insurance Program, insurance has primarily been regulated at the state level. Due to recent events such as 9/11 and the need for Terrorism insurance, rapidly rising healthcare costs, and the massive devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina, many are now looking to extend the federal government’s role in this industry.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In order to help policymakers evaluate the current alternative proposals and arguments, the Mercatus Center at George Mason University is sponsoring a seminar to address these issues and examine the economics of insurance. Key questions to be addressed include:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;What do the lessons of economics teach us about the most effective government role in insurance markets?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;What is it that private insurance can, and cannot, do?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;What are the important differences and similarities of the diverse segments of the insurance industry?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;How might increased government involvement in the industry alter the way in which it operates?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Seminar participants will leave with a framework for understanding the dynamics of insurance markets and a greater ability to evaluate policy options currently under consideration.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>chris myers</author><pubDate>Wed, 29 Apr 2009 14:44:52 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Rebuilding in the Wake of Crisis: Lessons from Hurricane Recovery</title><link>http://mercatus.org/EventDetails.aspx?id=16806</link><description>
&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Please &lt;a title="click here" href="http://http://mercatus.org/uploadedFiles/Mercatus/Events/Dr._Emily_Chamlee-Wright-_Lessons_from_the_Gulf_Coast.pdf"&gt;click here&lt;/a&gt; to view Dr. Chamlee-Wright's presentation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;h2&gt;Featuring:&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Dr. Emily Chamlee-Wright&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;font color="#000000"&gt;Senior Research Scholar&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Mercatus Center at George Mason University&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Elbert H. Neese Professor of Economics&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Beloit&lt;/em&gt;&lt;em&gt; College&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The recent fires in California were among the worst in the state's history, leaving extraordinary damage in their wake; 8 deaths, 2,000 homes destroyed, 640,000 residents displaced, and damage estimates surpassing one billion dollars. Now, with the worst of the fires now behind them, communities are beginning to rebuild. But what role can policy makers have in rebuilding, and how can they best understand the process?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fires caused a national response, and officials at FEMA and Red Cross pointed to the lessons of Hurricane Katrina in improving their disaster response this time around. What lessons, if any, can be gleaned from the citizens of Louisiana and Mississippi and their rebuilding efforts?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dr. Emily Chamlee-Wright of the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and Beloit College has spent the last two years learning from the Gulf Coast communities rebuilding in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Through her work at the Mercatus Center, Dr. Chamlee-Wright is examining how different social, legal, political, and economic institutions may affect communities before, during, and after disaster.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;During this lunch course Dr. Chamlee-Wright will draw on her research to answer some key questions regarding the California fires:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;What roles do the public, non-profit and for-profit sectors have in the rebuilding process?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;How do people and markets act during the rebuilding process?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;What challenges will policy makers face as communities begin to recover?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;How can policy and policy makers expedite the rebuilding process?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;----&lt;br /&gt;
Capital Campus California is a partnership between the &lt;a href="http://www.law.berkeley.edu/centers/bclbe/"&gt;Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the Economy&lt;/a&gt; and the &lt;a href="http://http://mercatus.org/"&gt;Mercatus Center at George Mason University&lt;/a&gt;.  For more information on this collaboration, visit Capital Campus California.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>chris myers</author><pubDate>Fri, 17 Oct 2008 14:51:38 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Rational Homeland Security: Lowering Obstacles and Creating Economic and Socially Sensible Policies</title><link>http://mercatus.org/EventDetails.aspx?id=16726</link><description>
&lt;h2&gt;Featuring:&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a title="Rep. Patrick Kennedy" href="http://patrickkennedy.house.gov/singlepage.aspx?NewsID=1254"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Rep. Patrick Kennedy&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a title="Click Here" href="http://video.google.com/googleplayer.swf?docId=73374739254810183&amp;amp;hl=en"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Click Here&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;em&gt; to view a video archive of this event.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Although the federal government spends tens of billions of dollars annually on homeland security, Americans remain unsure about the nation's ability to respond to disaster - whether natural or manmade. It seems that regardless of how much we spend and plan, we are unable to substantially reduce the harm done by disasters or prepare communities for emergencies.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Perhaps it is time to rethink how governments at all levels prepare for and respond to disasters, recognizing that the first response to any disaster will not be from professional first responders but ordinary citizens.  In an effort to advance the discussion surrounding important questions about disaster response and recovery, the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, in conjunction with the offices of Rep. Patrick Kennedy and Sen. Mary Landrieu and New York University's Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response, will host a special lunch briefing for policy makers. Panelists include:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a title="Dr. Emily Chamlee-Wright" href="http://http://mercatus.org/PeopleDetails.aspx?id=16894"&gt;Dr. Emily Chamlee-Wright&lt;/a&gt;, Affiliated Senior Scholar at the Mercatus Center and Professor of Economics at Beloit College;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://sociology.fas.nyu.edu/object/ericklinenberg.html"&gt;Dr. Eric Klinenberg&lt;/a&gt;, Professor of Sociology at New York University;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.cacsh.org/about.html#rlasker"&gt;Dr. Roz Lasker&lt;/a&gt;, Director of the Division of Public Health at the New York Academy of Medicine; and&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/center/staff/schoch-spana.html"&gt;Dr. Monica Schoch-Spana&lt;/a&gt;, Senior Associate at the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center.&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Participants will be able to hear from leading researchers as they look to answer the following questions:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;How can public policy help promote grassroots disaster response?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;How can homeland security spending better reflect actual needs and enhance rather than obstruct community response to disasters?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;How can we engage community resources and knowledge after a disaster to promote more effective responses?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a title="Empowering Local Response in the Wake of Disaster" href="http://http://mercatus.org/uploadedFiles/Mercatus/Events/EmpoweringLocalResponse%20-%20Chamlee-Wright.pdf"&gt;Empowering Local Response in the Wake of Disaster&lt;/a&gt; by Emily Chamlee-Wright&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>chris myers</author><pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2009 19:49:01 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Katrina&amp;#39;s Legacy: FEMA and the Economics of Disaster Relief</title><link>http://mercatus.org/EventDetails.aspx?id=16686</link><description>
&lt;p&gt;&lt;font size="5"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Featuring:&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;a title="Timothy Roemer" href="http://http://mercatus.org/PeopleDetails.aspx?id=17068"&gt;Hon. Tim Roemer&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Former U.S. Representative and Distinguished Scholar&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Mercatus Center at George Mason University&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;a title="Maurice McTigue" href="http://http://mercatus.org/PeopleDetails.aspx?id=17042"&gt;Hon. Maurice McTigue&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;Distinguished Visiting Scholar and Vice President&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Mercatus Center at George Mason University&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;a title="Jerry Ellig" href="http://http://mercatus.org/PeopleDetails.aspx?id=17058"&gt;Dr. Jerry Ellig&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;Senior Research Fellow&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Mercatus Center at George Mason University&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a title="CHC_FEMA_2005_09_23" href="http://http://mercatus.org/uploadedFiles/Mercatus/Events/MC_CHC_FEMA_2005_09_23.mp3"&gt;&lt;em&gt;Click Here&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;em&gt; to listen to audio archive.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As concerned citizens and policymakers ask impassioned questions about government failures in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, many are looking for a place for the blame to fall. Lost amid all the finger-pointing is a more important question: where do we go from here? What lessons need to be learned from Katrina that will better enable the nation to respond to future disasters, both natural and man-made?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The history of the Federal Emergency Management Agency has been tumultuous at best. It went from being referred to as “the sorriest bunch of bureaucratic jackasses” to what may have been “the most popular agency in the entire federal government” at its peak in the late-1990s. A collection of different but related management reforms brought FEMA to the forefront of government agencies. Since the 2000 election, how has the mission of FEMA changed? How has the merger with DHS affected FEMA’s efficiency? What, if anything, does this imply about the other organizations under the DHS umbrella?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At this critical point in time, it is vital that we not only look back at history’s lessons, but also look forward to ensure that government organizations are able to respond accordingly in times of need. To help foster a constructive climate for informed debate in the wake of Katrina, the Mercatus Center at George Mason University will host a seminar to discuss the following questions:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;What does Hurricane Katrina teach us about the structure and effectiveness of FEMA? Of other agencies within DHS?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;What are the dangers of merging different government organizations? Are historic missions lost in the transfer?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;How was FEMA able to experience such an impressive turnaround in the 1990s? What does this imply about other organizations within DHS?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;What questions need to be asked to ensure informed debate on Capitol Hill regarding the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;What can the lessons of economics teach us about how to ensure an effective government response to future disasters?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description><author>chris myers</author><pubDate>Thu, 26 Mar 2009 19:25:42 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>How We Came Back: Voices from Post-Katrina New Orleans: A Book Forum</title><link>http://mercatus.org/EventDetails.aspx?id=25860</link><description>
&lt;p align="left"&gt;The Social Change Project at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University presents a lecture by Nona Martin, Affiliated Scholar at the Mercatus Center.  Ms. Martin will discuss her recent work in the oral history of reconstruction and recovery from Hurricane Katrina.  The talk will be based on the forthcoming book&lt;em&gt; How We Came Back: Voices from Post-Katrina New Orleans&lt;/em&gt;, co-written with Prof. Chamlee-Wright of Beloit College and the Mercatus Center.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nona Martin is an Affiliated Senior Scholar with the Mercatus Center and a PhD Candidate in the Department of History and Art History at George Mason University.  Her research interests include Urban History, Public History, and Oral History and Memory, with a focus on social space as a stage for cultural expression and identity work. She is particularly interested in how Bahamians have used their urban spaces and how the people and these places have shaped one another.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ms. Martin has a MS in Secondary Education and MAs in both Library Sciences and Public History.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p align="left"&gt;For more information, please email &lt;a title="Stan Tsirulnikov" href="mailto:stsiruln@gmu.edu"&gt;Stan Tsirulnikov&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>stan tsirulnikov</author><pubDate>Fri, 19 Jun 2009 19:08:39 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Delivering the Goods: Lessons Learned in Disaster Response</title><link>http://mercatus.org/EventDetails.aspx?id=16824</link><description>
&lt;h2&gt;Featuring:&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a title="Dr. Steven Horwitz" href="http://http://mercatus.org/PeopleDetails.aspx?id=16928"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Dr. Steven Horwitz&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Charles Dana Professor of Economics&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;St. Lawrence University&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;a title="Eileen Norcross" href="http://http://mercatus.org/PeopleDetails.aspx?id=17224"&gt;Eileen Norcross&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Senior Research Fellow&lt;br /&gt;&lt;em&gt;Mercatus Center at George Mason University&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As the 1000-day anniversary of Hurricane Katrina approaches, many wonder exactly when the Gulf Coast will be back to normal, and why the recovery process has moved so slowly. With hurricane season 2008 quickly approaching, it's a good time to look at the lessons learned from the most expensive natural disaster in history. On Thursday, May 22&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;, the Mercatus Center at George Mason University will host a discussion on the effective disaster response from the public and private sectors.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dr. Steven Horwitz will explain how both public and private institutions must have the right incentives in order to be successful in their disaster response efforts. His recently published paper "Making Hurricane Response More Effective" notes the need for disaster response to happen at the local level, and involve the kind of local knowledge that managers of local business and officers in the US Coast Guard possess.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Eileen Norcross will discuss problems in Louisiana's distribution of federal disaster aid, called the Road Home program and the more successful fund distribution in Mississippi's program. Her study "The Road Home: Helping Homeowners in the Gulf after Katrina" argues that while trying to prevent fraud is a laudable goal, a quick turnaround for disaster relief checks is a more important objective because it fuels the larger recovery process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This event will address questions such as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;What are the key aspects of good disaster response and what factors lead to poor disaster response?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;What are the essential elements for effective disaster response among public-sector organizations?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;How can government at all levels work with the private sector in disaster response?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;Why are local institutions so important in response and recovery efforts?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description><author>chris myers</author><pubDate>Tue, 10 Mar 2009 15:38:47 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>California: The Role of the State in Disaster Response</title><link>http://mercatus.org/EventDetails.aspx?id=16762</link><description>
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a title="Dr. Emily Chamlee-Wright" href="http://http://mercatus.org/PeopleDetails.aspx?id=16894"&gt;Dr. Emily Chamlee-Wright&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Senior Scholar&lt;br /&gt;
Mercatus Center at GMU&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a title="Dr. Mary Comerio" href="http://www.ced.berkeley.edu/ced/people/query.php?id=39&amp;amp;dept=all&amp;amp;title=all&amp;amp;first=Mary&amp;amp;last=Comerio&amp;amp;ced&amp;amp;berkeley"&gt;Dr. Mary Comerio&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Professor of Architecture&lt;br /&gt;
UC Berkeley&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;a title="Dr. Dan Farber" href="http://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/faculty/facultyProfile.php?facID=1141"&gt;Dr. Dan Farber&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
Sho Sato Professor of Law&lt;br /&gt;
UC Berkeley, Boalt Hall&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nearly a year has passed since Hurricane Katrina made landfall in the United States.  And while efforts to rebuild are well underway in many of the Gulf Coast communities devastated by the storm, the appalling accounts of human suffering in the aftermath of the hurricane have lingered in the minds of Americans.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Hurricane Katrina was neither the first nor the last major disaster to hit the United States, but preparations and response were clearly inadequate.  In order to prevent the next disaster from becoming a tragedy, policymakers at the federal, state, and local levels must consider the institutions and policies that succeeded and failed in the wake of Katrina and other calamities.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;California is no stranger to natural disasters.  This course will bring fresh insight to the question of disaster response and recovery on the state level by exploring the lessons of Katrina and other tragedies as they apply to California. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Participants will address such questions as:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;What can the Katrina tragedy reveal about successful and unsuccessful disaster response policies?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;What are the strengths of the public, non-profit, and for-profit sectors in disaster response and why?  How can the consideration of those strengths contribute to more effective policymaking in California?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;How is disaster response authority divided among federal, state, and local governments?  What challenges does the current regulatory framework pose to successful cooperation among these jurisdictions?&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
</description><author>heather allen</author><pubDate>Tue, 14 Oct 2008 17:43:58 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>After the Storm: Finding Success in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina</title><link>http://mercatus.org/EventDetails.aspx?id=16704</link><description>
&lt;h2&gt;Featuring:&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Nearly a year has passed since Hurricane Katrina made landfall in the United States.  And while efforts to rebuild are well underway in many of the Gulf Coast communities devastated by the storm, the appalling accounts of human suffering in the aftermath of the hurricane have lingered in the minds of Americans.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has spent the last year learning from the Gulf Coast communities rebuilding in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.  With focused efforts in Orleans and St. Bernard Parishes in Louisiana and Harrison and Hancock Counties in Mississippi, the Mercatus Center is examining how different social, legal, political, and economic institutions affected different communities before, during, and after the hurricane. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To share its preliminary findings and discuss the real world implications of its research, the Mercatus Center will host a workshop held exclusively for policymakers.  The workshop will address the role that for-profit businesses, non-profit organizations, and governments are playing in the rebuilding process and attempt to determine where - and why - each sector has its greatest successes.  In addition, the workshop will examine how each of these sectors interact, where they build synergies, and where they work at cross purposes.   Workshop participants will work with Mercatus Center scholars and guests to try and answer the following questions:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;ul&gt;
&lt;li&gt;What policy-related lessons can be taken away from the tragedy of Hurricane Katrina?  How can policymakers prepare for future disasters?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;How have communities in the Gulf Coast responded in the months following Katrina?  How have communities prepared for this hurricane season?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
&lt;li&gt;How can the strengths of for-profit, non-profit, and public sectors be incorporated to allow better response to disasters - natural or manmade - in the future?  &lt;/li&gt;
&lt;/ul&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Hurricane Katrina was neither the first nor the last major disaster to hit the United States.  In the midst of this hurricane season, it is imperative that policymakers understand which institutions and policies succeeded and those that failed.  By better understanding the answer to this question, we can keep our next disaster from becoming a tragedy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Hurricane Katrina was neither the first nor the last major disaster to hit the United States.  In the midst of this hurricane season, it is imperative that policymakers understand which institutions and policies succeeded and those that failed.  By better understanding the answer to this question, we can keep our next disaster from becoming a tragedy.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>chris myers</author><pubDate>Thu, 19 Mar 2009 19:19:53 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>The Myths of Hurricane Katrina-Myth Number Two-New Orleans and the Gulf Coast are Synonymous</title><link>http://mercatus.org/MediaDetails.aspx?id=22348</link><description>
&lt;p&gt;Rather than deal with the nuances affecting communities in
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, the media like to cover New
Orleans as if it is synonymous with the entire area affected by
Hurricane Katrina. This is similar to the way the media often
treats &amp;quot;Africa&amp;quot; as if it were one extremely large,
monolithic country.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Many well-researched stories by dedicated reporters have come
out of New Orleans in the past two years. But what&amp;#39;s largely
missing is any coverage of the Louisianan parishes near New
Orleans, or of the many counties in Mississippi also hit by
Katrina. In the aftermath of Katrina, the Red Cross provided
assistance to some 4 million people, although only 450,000 people
lived in New Orleans. President Bush&amp;#39;s disaster declaration
covered 90,000 square miles. New Orleans encompasses only 350
square miles, almost half of it water. Many parts of New Orleans
did not flood, but over 99 percent of buildings in neighboring St.
Bernard Parish did.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Why, then, does New Orleans receive the majority of the media
coverage? Reporters disproportionately focus on New Orleans because
it&amp;#39;s more interesting, it fits more preconceived narratives,
and it is, paradoxically, both a simpler and more complex story
than other areas damaged by Katrina.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The complexity stems from the diversity of experiences across
New Orleans&amp;#39; neighborhoods and communities. No single
factor--be it financial resources, political power, geography, or
demography--portends an area&amp;#39;s post-Katrina experience. The
wealthy Lakeview area, for example, took over a year to show any
progress, while working-class Broadmoor began rebuilding within
weeks. The previously apolitical, keep-to-themselves
Vietnamese-American community in New Orleans East began rebuilding
homes and packing their church for Mass before Entergy, the local
power monopoly, would even turn their electricity back on. This
complexity creates human interest stories, which reporters package
into pre-imagined narratives of race, class, and power, even if the
anecdotes don&amp;#39;t fit what&amp;#39;s actually happening.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;But the New Orleans story is also simple, because it can be told
through the lens of the same superficial, Disneyfied version of New
Orleans that informed most Americans&amp;#39; conceptions of the city
before Katrina. Few visitors to New Orleans ventured outside of the
French Quarter, Business District, and Garden District. However,
New Orleans as understood by the majority of its residents is more
complex than an hour-long tour or weekend bender lets on. Since
Katrina, reporters focus on telling stories through the
tourism-and-jazz lens, despite the fact that before Katrina,
shipping and related industries represented more income and more
jobs than tourism. But the familiar stereotypes make for easy
reporting.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;New Orleans is still struggling, but it is not alone. For all
the frustration people in New Orleans feel about warped or clichéd
coverage, people in Mississippi and Louisiana locales outside New
Orleans get almost no coverage at all. Across the Pearl River,
Louisianans feel that Mississippians are getting more than their
share of federal money. Key to making sense of this is
understanding that Louisiana and Mississippi experienced very
different storms.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Mississippi suffered hurricane damage. In many areas,
Katrina&amp;#39;s storm surge penetrated a mile inland, to the raised
CSX railroad tracks, which act as a levee and broke much of the
surge&amp;#39;s power, and washed away virtually everything in its
path. Further inland, homes and businesses were flooded and damaged
by 140-mph winds. The destruction was significant - but St. Bernard
Parish and the New Orleans&amp;#39; Lower Ninth Ward suffered more.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Orleans and St. Bernard Parishes in Louisiana were, by contrast,
not victims of a traditional hurricane, but of poor government and
central planning, which allowed massive but preventable flooding.
In these areas, levees, floodwalls, and engineering projects
designed to keep flooding out failed, and instead kept water in.
For periods ranging from days to weeks, entire neighborhoods sat
underwater, while antiquated city pumps slowly inched down the
flooding. Mississippi was hit by a moderately sized hurricane,
while Louisiana suffered from a flood of biblical proportions.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This crucial distinction is often lost in media coverage.
That&amp;#39;s unfortunate, because understanding it is vital to
understanding the subsequent recovery efforts. Reporters and
pundits sometimes distinguish Louisiana and Mississippi by noting
the marked difference in the two states&amp;#39; recovery periods.
Frequently, Mississippi&amp;#39;s lower taxes, less generous welfare
programs, and Republican leadership get credit for making the state
less dependent on Washington, and therefore better able to pull
itself up by the straps of its collective hip-waders. Many
Mississippians that I and my colleagues have interviewed or spoken
with have bought into this story - &amp;quot;we&amp;quot; are not like
&amp;quot;them.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Truth be told, neither state is an exemplar of self-sufficiency
or probity. According to the Tax Foundation, in 2004 Louisiana got
back $1.45, while Mississippi received $1.77, for every dollar sent
to Washington. Researchers Russell Sobel and Peter Leeson point out
that while Louisiana does bear the ignominy of the highest rate of
public corruption in the country, Mississippi isn&amp;#39;t far behind.
In other words, while differences exist, neither Mississippi nor
Louisiana are paragons of virtuous - or limited - government.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The speed and quality of the recovery effort along the Gulf
Coast have depended upon a number of factors: the type and amount
of damage from the storm, insurance coverage on affected homes and
businesses, whether governments made credible commitments about
infrastructure and the &amp;quot;rules of the game&amp;quot; for
rebuilding, and the inherent resilience of the communities
affected. Indeed, community resilience is a perhaps the most
critical factor in recovery, and one that researchers are just
beginning to understand.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The most effective solutions to rebuilding are actually coming
from people, not governments. So it&amp;#39;s not really prudent to
discuss recovery in conventional, red-blue political geography.
While governance is important, it hasn&amp;#39;t been the sole or even
primary determinant of the recovery process. What&amp;#39;s happened
since Katrina is far too complex for neatly-packaged conclusions
about party or ideological supremacy, or to draw broad inferences
about the nature of people in Mississippi, New Orleans, or those
Louisianans outside of New Orleans.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Scholars will undoubtedly debate the legacy of Katrina for
decades, and we will hopefully learn a great deal about the role
that politics and public policy played in the recovery process. But
even today, two things are evident: Political geography is not the
silver bullet for explaining the response to disasters, and
Katrina&amp;#39;s impact wasn&amp;#39;t uniform across the Gulf Coast.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Tomorrow: Myth 3: The Gulf Coast is suffering from a crisis of
leadership.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>Daniel Rothschild</author><pubDate>Thu, 18 Sep 2008 06:53:03 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Stimulus talks under time pressure</title><link>http://mercatus.org/MediaDetails.aspx?id=26068</link><description>
Eileen Norcross is quoted in the Times Picayune about similarities
between the Gulf Coast recovery and stimulus package. Read the
complete story here . 

&lt;p&gt;Eileen Norcross, a senior fellow at the Mercatus Center, a
conservative think tank, said the Obama administration should learn
from the problems the federal government had in trying to funnel
hundreds of millions of dollars to the Gulf Coast after Hurricane
Katrina. She said the flow of money was slowed by bureaucratic
squabbles and conflicting rules for different federal programs and
agencies.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Norcross said Obama might do well to appoint an official to
oversee the release of stimulus money to avoid similar
problems.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>Eileen Norcross</author><pubDate>Wed, 11 Feb 2009 17:01:54 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Mercatus Center Marks Third Anniversary of Hurricane Katrina with New Publication</title><link>http://mercatus.org/MediaDetails.aspx?id=22588</link><description>
&lt;p&gt;Washington, D.C.-&amp;quot;When it comes to disaster recovery, local
knowledge is better than conventional wisdom&amp;quot; concludes
research released today by the Mercatus Center at George Mason
University.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&amp;quot;Local Knowledge: Is the Gulf Coast Open for
Business?&amp;quot; is the first of three annual reports from the
Mercatus Center at George Mason University on the rebuilding of
Louisiana and Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In fall of 2005, the Mercatus Center launched a five-year
project in the Gulf Coast to study recovery and rebuilding where it
happens: on the ground. Over 350 interviews and numerous studies
later, researchers are able to say with confidence that the people
who are rebuilding the Gulf Coast are the people who live
there.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&amp;quot;It&amp;#39;s the entrepreneurial people of the Gulf Coast-with
their spirit, creativity, and tenacity-who are rebuilding their
homes, businesses, churches, and communities.  Entrepreneurs like
these are part of their communities and have a vested interest in
rebuilding,&amp;quot; says senior scholar the Honorable Timothy Roemer,
&amp;quot;It&amp;#39;s important as we approach the third anniversary of
Hurricane Katrina that we don&amp;#39;t lose focus on the people of the
Gulf Coast, they&amp;#39;ve made great strides but they and we as a
country have a long way to go.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&amp;quot;The answer to the question, &amp;#39;Is the Gulf Coast open
for business&amp;#39; is &amp;#39;Yes, but.&amp;quot;  We&amp;#39;ve learned that
local mom-and-pop businesses and retail giants like Wal-Mart and
Home Depot with international supply chains and distribution
systems play critical roles in a community&amp;#39;s recovery,
rebuilding their communities from the bottom up.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&amp;quot;But, public policy too often didn&amp;#39;t give creative,
driven, and resilient entrepreneurs the space they needed to be
most effective after disasters. Too many roadblocks remain, and
there&amp;#39;s too much uncertainty for entrepreneurs to do everything
they&amp;#39;ve shown they can do.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&amp;quot;In short, what we&amp;#39;ve learned is that in a crisis of
this magnitude, an over-reliance on the federal response and an
under-reliance on local knowledge can cripple rather than drive
recovery. Reasonable people can disagree on the specifics, but we
can and should agree as a country that we must continue to put a
sustained effort into rebuilding the Gulf Coast, learning from this
disaster, and applying the lessons learned to future
scenarios,&amp;quot; Roemer said.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;New Orleans native, Tim Williamson, president of Idea Village,
an independent non-profit started by local entrepreneurs before
Katrina works with a number of entrepreneurs who have been
rebuilding their businesses and communities. &amp;quot;The storm put
what we already knew into a sharper focus -- entrepreneurs are
critical to building a strong community and a catalyst to
revitalizing New Orleans,&amp;quot; says Williamson, &amp;quot;New Orleans
has become a laboratory. In three years we see real work and real
data and we are creating scalable solutions to problems that are
around the country and around the world.&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;With articles on topics such as the performance of
government-sponsored disaster relief programs, the vital
contributions of big box stores to rebuilding, the nature of
entrepreneurship, and what Louisiana can do to spur recovery and
interviews with some of the entrepreneurs themselves, &amp;quot;Local
Knowledge: Is the Gulf Coast Open for Business?&amp;quot; presents a
view into the driving force of the Gulf Coast&amp;#39;s recovery: the
hearts, minds, and resilient spirit of its people.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For more information on &amp;quot;Local Knowledge: Is the Gulf Coast
Open for Business?&amp;quot; and the Gulf Coast Project, contact Carrie
Conko at &lt;a href="mailto:cconko@gmu.edu"&gt;cconko@gmu.edu or
703-993-4899.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>Timothy Roemer</author><pubDate>Sun, 14 Sep 2008 06:18:28 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Mercatus Center at George Mason University Recognized for Advancing Liberty</title><link>http://mercatus.org/MediaDetails.aspx?id=24520</link><description>
&lt;p&gt;Arlington, VA – October 20, 2008 – The Atlas Economic Research Foundation today made an award to the Mercatus Center at George Mason University for its work on the Gulf Coast Recovery Project. The award, the 2008 Templeton Freedom Award, recognizes the contributions of independent research organizations to promote liberty in a civil society.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Mercatus Center at George Mason University is a research, education, and outreach organization that works with scholars, policy experts, and government officials to connect academic learning and real world practice. Mercatus received the “Award for Special Achievement by a University-based Center.”&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;“Now in its third year, the [Gulf Coast Recovery] project has attracted over 20 scholars and graduate students to monitor the response and recovery efforts, assess the effectiveness of the rebuilding efforts, and explain the role free enterprise and civil society play in preparedness and response to future crises,” Atlas stated in announcing the award.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita devastated the Gulf Coast in 2005 Mercatus scholars and students have led a sustained effort to discover what’s working–and what’s not–in order to inform scholarship and future policy decisions. They continue to examine the roles that for profit companies, nonprofit groups, and government policy play in responding to disaster and rebuilding the Gulf Coast.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Mercatus scholars have spent months conducting fieldwork in the Gulf Coast, including over 450 extensive interviews with the entrepreneurs, community leaders, public officials, and everyday citizens who are doing the hard work of rebuilding.  The resulting studies have created a formidable expertise among a cadre of scholars ready to address similar situations in the future. An independent evaluator involve in making the award noted, “Mercatus had good research on a timely and dramatic choice of topics. They grabbed a ‘teachable moment.’ They also extended the fruits of their research to a wide range of audiences. I give them highest marks for rigor, timeliness, and outreach.”&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;“We are honored to have our research and outreach recognized by the Atlas and Templeton Foundations,” said Peter Boettke, Vice President for Research at the Mercatus Center and the principle investigator on the Gulf Coast Recovery Project.&lt;br /&gt;
“With the United States facing a financial crisis, it’s more critical than ever that we apply the tools of economic science and the lessons learned from Katrina about the limitations of the public sector to better understand how to prepare for and respond to disasters, whether natural or man-made.”&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Mercatus’s mission is to promote sound interdisciplinary research and application in the humane sciences that integrates theory and practice to produce solutions that advance in a sustainable way a free, prosperous, and civil society. Mercatus’s research and outreach programs, Capitol Hill Campus, Government Accountability Project, Regulatory Studies Program, Social Change Project and Global Prosperity Initiative support this mission.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p align="center"&gt;###&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>Carrie Conko</author><pubDate>Wed, 22 Oct 2008 04:57:31 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Letters to the Editor: Nonprofits and New Orleans</title><link>http://mercatus.org/MediaDetails.aspx?id=22582</link><description>
&lt;p&gt;As we approach the third anniversary of Hurricane Katrina,
requests for additional government involvement in the restoration
operations of nonprofit groups [&amp;quot;Some Nonprofits Push for
Increased Federal Involvement,&amp;quot; front page, Aug. 19] run
counter to the experience of the past three years.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
It is undeniable that nonprofit organizations are playing a crucial
role in rebuilding New Orleans and other areas -- a role that would
have been impossible for them to carry out if, instead of answering
to donors, boards and the community, they had been answering to New
Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin and Homeland Security Secretary Michael
Chertoff.&lt;br /&gt;
 &lt;br /&gt;
It is the nonprofit groups&amp;#39; independence from bureaucracy that
makes them so capable -- and so critical to the rebuilding
work.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>Daniel Rothschild</author><pubDate>Sun, 14 Sep 2008 06:07:23 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Katrina&amp;#39;s Real Heroes</title><link>http://mercatus.org/MediaDetails.aspx?id=22530</link><description>
&lt;p&gt;It is just a month shy of three years since Hurricane Katrina
landed on the Louisiana coast, leaving an unprecedented trail of
destruction across that state and neighboring Mississippi. Damages
total into the hundreds of billions of dollars, plus billions more
in lost productivity. More than 1,600 people died, and we may never
know the final figure.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 The storm left 35 times as much debris as the September 11, 2001,
attacks across an area twice the size of England. It is one of the
largest disasters in American history, and one that had become a
byword for a host of social ills and failures.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 In the days and weeks after the storm, a significant contingent
from the chattering and political classes - most memorably the
House Speaker at the time, Dennis Hastert - questioned the wisdom
of rebuilding after the damage. The task was so mammoth and
unprecedented that nobody knew where to begin.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 While the elites wrung their hands, the mayor of New Orleans, Ray
Nagin, cursed the feds on television, and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency redefined &amp;quot;incompetence&amp;quot; as a fleet of
thousands began sailing back into New Orleans and other cities and
towns devastated by Katrina.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 The entrepreneurs had arrived.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 While the press has largely spent the last three years focusing on
the failures of government at all levels to rebuild the Gulf Coast,
entrepreneurs have been quietly doing what no government is capable
of - leading the rebuilding effort. And in the process they&amp;#39;re
proving that local knowledge trumps conventional wisdom when it
comes to rebuilding after tragedy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 After natural catastrophes, communities need the business sector
to take leadership in rebuilding them for two key reasons.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 First, without the business and the jobs and the normalcy they
provide, rebuilding is simply not sustainable. Ask people after a
disaster what they want, and most will tell you that they want
things back the way they were before - and, in fact, better. They
yearn for the quotidian life of going to work, shopping for
groceries, hanging out at the local coffee shop, taking the kids to
school, etc. None want to be fed by charities and housed in
trailers. Businesses are critical to returning to status quo and
shrugging off what one Louisianan dubbed the &amp;quot;FEMA
economy.&amp;quot;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 But even more importantly, entrepreneurs are the risk-takers who
can quickly judge the needs of their communities, figure out what
resources can be brought to bear and to get things done, from
clearing debris to opening schools, that would take bureaucrats
months or years to plan and execute.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 Tim Williamson, the president of the Idea Village, a non-profit
that supports local entrepreneurs in New Orleans, argues that
entrepreneurs were able to take the lead in rebuilding southeast
Louisiana because they practiced what he called
&amp;quot;entrepreneurial yoga&amp;quot; by remaining relevant, flexible,
and, most of all, resilient. While bureaucracies by nature and by
design are rule-bound and inflexible, entrepreneurs are risk-taking
and adaptable. As situations change, so do entrepreneurs&amp;#39;
plans. Therein lies their magic.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 The conventional wisdom argues that the answer to better disaster
response is more flexible bureaucracies. This is fatuous. Public
bureaucracies, as manifestations of governmental authority, have to
be rule-bound. The only realistic alternative is subjecting people
to the whims of individual bureaucrats. So-called &amp;quot;flexible
bureaucracies&amp;quot; substitute the rule of law with the whims of a
thousand little potentates.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 This conventional wisdom further says that disasters on the
magnitude of Katrina are so big that only government can
orchestrate rebuilding. The opposite is true. The problem is so big
that it can&amp;#39;t be orchestrated from the top down. It&amp;#39;s
hundreds of thousands of people making millions of decisions.
That&amp;#39;s why, across the Gulf Coast, we&amp;#39;ve seen that
bottom-up solutions succeed while top-down solutions fail.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 Certainly, people demand that government play a role in supporting
entrepreneurs after disasters. But again, the conventional wisdom
on what works best is wrong. It&amp;#39;s not small business
administration disaster loans, which are too little too late for
the entrepreneurs who begin their recovery hours after a disaster.
It&amp;#39;s not targeted tax incentives, which are thinly-veiled
corporate welfare and social engineering schemes. And it&amp;#39;s
certainly not big new redevelopment plans that throw property and
contract rights to the winds.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 Government at all levels can best support post-disaster recovery
by making clear, realistic goals such as getting utilities
restored, reopening schools, and establishing rules for permitting
and debris removal - and sticking to them. This gives entrepreneurs
the information they need to get on with leading their communities
back to some level of normalcy.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 After Katrina and when other disasters strike, we don&amp;#39;t need
committees. We don&amp;#39;t need new laws. We don&amp;#39;t need to look
to Washington. Instead, we need to look to the people on the ground
who can make things happen: the entrepreneurs.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
 Mr. Rothschild manages the post-disaster research initiative at
the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, which just released
a collection of new studies about the role of the for-profit sector
in post-Katrina rebuilding.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>Daniel Rothschild</author><pubDate>Sun, 14 Sep 2008 06:16:33 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Katrina Response And The Bailout: Twin Disasters</title><link>http://mercatus.org/MediaDetails.aspx?id=26142</link><description>
&lt;p&gt;Garett Jones and Daniel Rothschild discuss similarities between
the Katrina recovery and the bailout on Forbes.com.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;On the surface, Hurricane Katrina and the financial crisis might
not seem to have much in common. One was a natural disaster, the
other a story of man-made markets collapsing. One struck the poor
and defenseless, the other, the hubristic masters of the universe.
One concentrated its wrath on a small area of the Gulf Coast, the
other will have effects felt across the country and indeed the
world. But Washington used a similar recipe to respond to both
crises: Create programs that quickly shift from one purpose to
another, mix with complete opacity in the policymaking process and
add some frequent and seismic shifts in what economists call the
rules of the game. The result is quite predictable: A bad situation
that grows much, much worse. For example, compare the Louisiana
Road Home Program, intended to compensate Louisianans whose homes
had been damaged by Katrina, to the Treasury Department&amp;#39;s
Troubled Asset Relief Plan, TARP. The Road Home Program was
intended to encourage Louisianans to return home and repair their
owner-occupied properties. However, it quickly morphed into a
social engineering scheme that fell between the Department of
Housing and Urban Development&amp;#39;s rules for a compensation
program and a revitalization program; it was a hybrid that fell
into a regulatory black hole from which homeowners are still trying
to escape. While initially designed to rapidly provide rebuilding
assistance to residents, it was loaded down with caveats and
clauses meant to engineer a particular rebuilding plan, rather than
allow the rebuilding to emerge spontaneously. Government rules
became government direction, and private decision making was shoved
into the back corner. As a result of this mission creep, the
program became painfully slow: By the end of 2007, two years after
Katrina, only about one-fourth of Road Home applications had been
finalized. The biggest problem with Road Home was that it caused
people to wait for promised federal help, and indeed, some people
are still waiting. The initial promise of quick and easy government
assistance combined with inept program administration and a 57-step
application process mean that even three years after Katrina,
thousands of homeowners are still waiting for their checks.
What&amp;#39;s more, the social engineering aspects of the program,
intended to rebuild whole neighborhoods, have failed miserably. So
government action delayed private action and government plans
crowded out local solutions. But if you liked the effects of Road
Home, you&amp;#39;ll love the results of TARP, or as it&amp;#39;s now
called under new Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, the
government&amp;#39;s &amp;quot;Financial Stability Plan.&amp;quot; According to
former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, the bailout plan had to be
passed to prevent a full-scale collapse of world financial markets.
Congress dutifully passed the bill, yet the stock and commercial
paper markets collapsed anyway, a sign that the markets didn&amp;#39;t
like what they saw in the bailout bill. Now, in a classic example
of mission creep, the old TARP funds have become auto bailout
funds, mortgage restructuring funds, and most ominously, equity
investment funds. As the rules change on a weekly basis, businesses
are just sitting on the sidelines, and investment spending is
plummeting. Both the Financial Stability Plan and the Road Home
program favor stability over progress and predictable mediocrity
over vibrant innovation. And both make the government a
dominant--indeed, domineering--partner in recovery. Every day, we
see the new demands put forward by the Treasury, by congressional
chairmen, by senators. They&amp;#39;re almost acting like they own
these companies. Which, of course, they almost do. But more
significantly, these twin bailouts weaken the entrepreneurial
impulse that is vital for effective rebuilding, whether on the Gulf
Coast or in financial markets. In Louisiana, areas where
entrepreneurs and innovators have taken the lead in rebuilding are
light years ahead of areas still waiting on Road Home checks.
Opting out of the government&amp;#39;s shekels means opting out of
government&amp;#39;s shackles. The financial bailout is teaching the
banking sector (a term that seems to encompass more of the economy
with every passing day) to behave like a government agency: keep
your head down, and better to be safe than sorry. Customers are to
be tolerated, not served. Above all, be risk averse, and paper over
any failures no matter how glaring. This was the mentality that in
post-bubble Japan created zombie firms and zombie banks, which led
to a decade of stable, no-work jobs at the price of wage
stagnation, profit stagnation and productivity stagnation. Welcome
now to American zombie banks and zombie mortgages, to a world where
the titans of Wall Street learn to act like predictable,
dependable, innovation-free federal bureaucrats, where people are
held captive in their homes because they&amp;#39;ve got low-cost,
government-subsidized mortgages. Over the next few years, we&amp;#39;ll
be reminded again that the two words in Schumpeter&amp;#39;s famous
phrase, &amp;quot;creative destruction&amp;quot; are only offered as a
package deal. Economics shows that government failure is at least
as important as market failure; the mismanagement of Katrina
provides too many real-life examples of so many government
failures. And as endless bailouts encourage the private sector to
behave like government agencies, we&amp;#39;ll get to see supposedly
private businesses duplicate many of the failings of government
bureaucracies: the caution, the sluggishness, the deference to
government power. That&amp;#39;s just what post-Katrina policy
encouraged Louisianans to do. And it&amp;#39;s what the Bailout Nation
is doing now to our financial markets, our auto companies, and, if
we&amp;#39;re not careful, to the rest of the U.S. economy. Garett
Jones is assistant professor of economics and senior scholar at the
Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Daniel Rothschild
directs the Mercatus Center&amp;#39;s Gulf Coast Recovery Project.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>Garett Jones, Daniel Rothschild</author><pubDate>Wed, 25 Feb 2009 15:01:53 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>If Spending Is Swift, Oversight May Suffer</title><link>http://mercatus.org/MediaDetails.aspx?id=26056</link><description>
&lt;p&gt;Eileen Norcross is quoted in a  Washington Post story about the economic stimulus proposal. &lt;a title="Read the entire article here" href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/08/AR2009020802367.html?hpid=topnews"&gt;Read the entire article here&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The stimulus plan presents a stark choice: The government can spend unprecedented amounts of money quickly in an effort to jump-start the economy or it can move more deliberately to thwart the cost overruns common to federal contracts in recent years. "You can't have both," said Eileen Norcross, a senior research fellow at George Mason University's Mercatus Center who studied crisis spending in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. "There is no way to get around having to make a choice." "We have to beef up the acquisition personnel and the resources of the inspectors general or you cannot get to accountability," she said. "This bill isn't cheap, but it will cost us far more in the long run if we don't do this right."&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>Eileen Norcross</author><pubDate>Tue, 10 Feb 2009 12:36:45 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Disaster Loan Reform Waiting to Happen</title><link>http://mercatus.org/MediaDetails.aspx?id=26784</link><description>
&lt;p&gt;Mercatus Center Senior Research Fellow Veronique de Rugy addresses the Small Business Administration's disaster relief funding in the Spring 2009 issue of &lt;em&gt;Regulation&lt;/em&gt; magazine. Read the article &lt;a title="here" href="http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv32n1/v32n1-noted.pdf#page=5"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>Veronique de Rugy</author><pubDate>Wed, 08 Apr 2009 17:01:48 GMT</pubDate></item><item><title>Daniel M. Rothschild Talks about Hurricane Gustav and Lessons Learned from Katrina</title><link>http://mercatus.org/MediaDetails.aspx?id=22586</link><description>
&lt;p&gt;Daniel M. Rothschild talked about how the Gulf Coast and
governments have responded to Hurricane Gustav and the lessons
learned from recovery in the Gulf Coast after Hurricane
Katrina.&lt;/p&gt;
</description><author>Daniel Rothschild</author><pubDate>Sun, 14 Sep 2008 06:04:01 GMT</pubDate></item></channel></rss>