The American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA, P.L. 112-240) may be more significant for what it does not do than for what it does. Hopes for a ‘‘grand bargain’’ were not realized. In fact, ATRA does (almost) nothing to address the major fiscal problems that the United States continues to face.
In the end, he endorses a “zero tolerance” approach to subsidies and tax loopholes while he is more comfortable with regulatory interventions. This is curious. The regulatory process is opaque and complex, arguably making the code of federal regu- lations an easier place to hide a targeted privilege than the federal budget or the tax code. But Zingales hasn’t enough time to dwell on such considerations; he has too many other interesting and creative ideas to consider.
The authors argue that, for Hayek, market institutions rather than individual agents bear the primary cognitive burden in coordinating economic activity. Gaps in individual rationality thus fail to provide adequate grounds for positing market failures.
This paper will consider the structure of fear appeal arguments in technology policy debates and then outline how those arguments can be deconstructed and refuted in both cultural and economic contexts. Several examples of fear appeal arguments will be offered with a particular focus on online child safety, digital privacy, and cybersecurity. The various factors contributing to “fear cycles” in these policy areas will be documented.
Since at least the days of Adam Smith, economists have suspected that economic freedom was a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for human prosperity. Smith wrote of freedom as a “system of natural liberty” and declared that “Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice.”…
The theory of rational irrationality suggests that voters are biased and do not face sufficient incentives to choose rationally; instead they vote for various private reasons. As a result, socially and economically destructive policies can receive widespread public support.
Theories of political entrepreneurship usually focus on the construction of coalitions necessary to change policy. We argue that political entrepreneurs who are unable to secure favored policies may redirect their efforts to a “higher tier,” attempting to change the rules of the game to enable the exploitation of future political profit opportunities.
To the extent public utility-style regulation has been debated within the Intemet policy arena over the past decade, the focus has been almost entirely on the physical layer of the Internet. The question has been whether Internet service providers should be considered "essential facilities" or "natural monopolies" and therefore regulated as public utilities. Such concerns served to drive the debate over "net neutrality" regulation.
Cybersecurity proponents often rely upon cyber-doom scenarios as a key tactic for calling attention to prospective cyber-threats. This essay critically examines cyber-doom scenarios by placing them into a larger historical context, assessing how realistic they are, and drawing out the policy implications of relying upon such tales. It draws from relevant research in the history of technology, military history, and disaster sociology to examine some of the key assertions and assumptions of cyber-doom scenarios. It argues that cyber-doom scenarios are the latest manifestation of fears about “technology-out-of-control” in Western societies, that they are unrealistic, and that they encourage the adoption of counter-productive, even dangerous policies. The paper concludes by offering alternative principles for the formulation of cybersecurity policy.
When OSHA was established, proponents believed it would dramatically improve the safety and health of American workers. During the forty years of its existence, workplace fatalities and nonfatal injuries and illnesses have fallen but OSHA is not the major cause of this decline. Changes in the industrial mix of workers and improvements in safety technology have combined with expanded employer incentives unrelated to OSHA to decrease worker injuries and illnesses. The financial incentives for employers to expand expenditures on worker safety and health created by the labor market, states' workers' compensation insurance programs, and the legal system swamp the meager incentives created by OSHA.
In a new video, Mercatus Center Senior Research Fellow Brian Blase discusses a report from the Department of Health and Human Services that finds Medicaid enrollees who gained coverage through the Affordable Care Act cost almost 50 percent more, on average, than the government projected just one year ago.
Central banks' part in the Great Recession, and the lackluster recovery since, are reviving interest in monetary rules. That revival raises crucial questions. Might the Federal Reserve and other central banks have performed better if they’d adhered to monetary policy rules? Could rules have avoided the crisis altogether? Can they avoid future crises? If so, which rules work best? Can a monetary policy rule work even in a world of near-zero, or negative, interest rates?
Rebounding after disasters like tsunamis, hurricanes, earthquakes, and floods can be daunting. How do residents of these communities gain access to the resources they need to rebuild while overcoming the collective action problem that characterizes post-disaster relief efforts?
Please join the F. A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University for a panel discussion featuring Hayek Program Senior Fellow Virgil Storr and his new book Community Revival in the Wake of Disaster: Lessons in Local Entrepreneurship.
As the world’s first decentralized digital currency, Bitcoin has the potential to revolutionize online payment systems and commerce in ways that benefit both consumers and businesses. Individuals can now avoid using an intermediary such as PayPal or submitting credit card information to a third party for verification—both of which often involve transaction fees, restrictions, and security risks—and instead use bitcoins to pay each other directly for goods or services.