Legal scholars and economists alike have been quite critical of F.A. Hayek’s legal theory. According to Richard Posner, Hayek’s legal theory is “formalist” and serves as a useless guide for legal and judges. We argue that these criticisms are misplaced, and we contend that Hayek’s legal theory cannot be separated from his economic theory. To establish this point, we trace the evolution of Hayek’s thought from his earlier writings in technical economics to his later writings on legal theory.

Following up on the recent studies by Stringham (2002, 2003), this paper focuses attention on the emergence of financial markets for several reasons. The common perception is that complicated financial instruments require state sanction to emerge. It is widely argued that in the absence of state regulation of of financial markets, cheating will be common. This paper shows, in contrast, that the evidence does not support this pessimistic view.

This paper develops a view of the extent of the market based on the katallactic notions advanced by Mises, Hayek, Buchanan, and others.

After the failure of western advice to aid former communist countries in their transitions to market economies, economists are faced with dilemma at the beginning of the 21st century that was widely recognized in the 19th century: to do good economics one must study the interaction of the economy, polity, and society.