Under the Government Performance and Results Act, the executive branch has a monopoly on the production of information about the performance of federal programs. Under Executive Order 12866, which governs regulatory analysis and review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, the executive branch has a monopoly on the production of information about the prospective and retrospective results of regulations. Mercatus Center research projects have found that GPRA and the executive orders on regulatory analysis have improved decision-makers’ knowledge about the results of programs and regulations. But as I noted in my testimony, we have also found that such analysis is often seriously incomplete.
While higher capital requirements can reduce the likelihood of banking crises, I would like to raise two key issues concerning the proposed policy statement: 1) bank subsidiary capital requirements may be more effective than holding company capital requirements, and 2) the benefit-cost analysis used to analyze the rule could be improved by adding other dimensions to the analysis.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has issued an interim final rule creating a new electronic registration system for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and requiring, for the first time, the registration of model aircraft operators. This comment highlights an omission in the agency’s alternative scenario analysis, questions some of the purported benefits of the rule, and points out some of the continuing legal shortcomings associated with the FAA’s approach. While we support the advent of a simple and streamlined registration system, we object to the extension of the registration requirement to model aircraft operators.
Virtually all states require auto manufacturers to sell new vehicles through local franchised dealers, protect dealers from competition in Relevant Market Areas, and terminate franchises with existing dealers only after proving they have a “good cause” to do so. In 1979, fewer than half of all states regulated all three of these aspects of the manufacturer-dealer relationship. By 2014, all but one state regulated every single one of these aspects. These state laws harm consumers by insulating dealers from competition and forestalling experimentation with new business models for auto retailing in the twenty-first century.
Contrary to Title II proponents’ claims, wireless carriers do not infringe free speech rights when they filter text messaging content they believe their customers do not wish to receive. Title II regulation of text messaging and short code service would not protect free speech. In fact, because mobile carriers exercise editorial discretion over mass messages they transmit, regulation would impermissibly chill wireless carriers’ exercise of speech. Further, since wireless carriers transmit short codes and other messaging based on individual arrangements and exercise control over the content of certain messages, messaging does not resemble telecommunications. For these reasons, regulating short code and similar messaging services under Title II of the Communications Act would likely be unconstitutional and contrary to law.
The first fundamental question for policymakers in this area is defining the policy goal. I believe the appropriate goal of competition policy related to online platforms should be the promotion of consumer welfare—a concept rigorously defined in the economics literature. Consumer welfare is maximized when every unit of every resource is employed in the use that consumers value most highly. Competition policy agencies in the United States typically regard consumer welfare as the sole goal of competition policy. Even if policymakers choose to pursue goals other than consumer welfare, they need to understand the impact of policies on consumer welfare so they can act with full information of the relevant tradeoffs.
The Department of Transportation (DOT) is proposing to implement a national registration system for small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs), the details of which are to be recom- mended by a task force no later than November 20. The stated aim of the registry is to assist in identifying owners and operators of UASs that violate the law and endanger safety, thereby closing a perceived gap in enforcement. This comment highlights several major procedural concerns, followed by an examination of whether the safety benefits of a registry are likely to outweigh the societal and budgetary costs.
After reviewing the NRC’s mission, its legislative mandates and constraints, and recent research on low-dose radiation, there appears to be strong evidence to support reconsidering the LNT as the default dose-response model for ionizing radiation.
This comment addresses the efficiency and efficacy of this proposed rule from an economic point of view. Specifically, it examines how the proposed rule may be improved by more closely examining the societal goals the rule intends to achieve and whether this proposed regulation will successfully achieve those goals. In many instances, regulations can be substantially improved by choosing more effective regulatory options or more carefully assessing the actual societal problem.
There is little evidence to support the claim that certificates of need are an effective cost-control measure; and Stratmann and Russ have found that these programs have no effect on the level of charity care provided to the poor. While controlling health care costs and increasing care for the poor may be laudable public policy goals, the evidence strongly suggests that CON regulations are not an effective mechanism for achieving them. Instead, these programs simply decrease the supply and availability of health care services by limiting entry and competition.
Nate Silver, today’s most influential statistician and founder of the award-winning data website FiveThirtyEight, will join Tyler Cowen for a wide-ranging, intellectual dialogue as part of the Conversations with Tyler series.
History has shown that tax reforms seldom last when special interests have substantial incentives to lobby Congress for tax breaks. Making the tax code as simple—by taxing a broad base at the same low rate—and as transparent as possible will help reduce the ability and incentives to reverse future tax reforms.