That many nongovernmental stakeholder communities are electing to participate in Internet governance processes on their own account implies that governments lack the consent necessary to legitimately exercise a primary role.
It is not clear based on the FDA’s analysis whether its proposed rule is in the best interest of society. FDA makes no attempt to estimate the benefits of the regulation, and the analysis of the costs is very likely biased downward due to questionable assumptions and omissions. Further, changes of behavior are only selectively considered—discussing them when logically leading to benefits but dismissing the costs associated with those changes in behavior.
Supporters of the blackout rules—like some sports leagues and broadcasters—argue that forcing blackouts on cable and satellite providers helps maintain free over-the-air broadcasts. That specious argument should be disregarded. Unlike the 1970s, few Americans now rely solely on broadcast television for their entertainment, so the FCC’s ill-advised attempt to shape markets only inhibits free competition.
In examining the reforms under consideration, first, I will discuss why regulatory accumulation is a public policy problem: regulatory accumulation creates substantial drag on economic growth by impeding innovation and entrepreneurship.
Enabling traders and exchanges to continue to work with regulators in a cooperative environment that recognizes the significant market incentives shared by all stakeholders to ensure trading system and market integrity is the best approach as we transition to technology-based markets.
When the Dodd-Frank Act was being developed, one issue under consideration was whether the Board should lose some of its regulatory powers in view of its poor regulatory performance prior to the crisis. Instead, Dodd-Frank substantially increased the Board’s regulatory powers. One of the most important new powers is the authority to regulate nonbank financial institutions designated systemically important by the Financial Stability Oversight Council. So far, General Electric Capital Corporation, American International Group, and Prudential have been so designated, with additional entities likely to follow. These financial institutions will present the bank-focused Board with new regulatory challenges. It is important that the Board respond with well-vetted, tailored regulations that recognize that these entities are not banks and cannot be effectively regulated as if they were.
Despite Washington’s recent focus on the disastrous Affordable Care Act website rollout, policymakers are missing what the rollout glitches symbolize: the fundamental flaws that imbue government intervention. The work of public choice economists such as Nobel laureate James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Mancur Olson, and William Niskanen has shown that, despite good intentions and lavish use of taxpayer resources, government solutions are not only unlikely to solve most of our problems—they often make problems worse.
Chairman Schweikert, Ranking Member Clarke, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be part of today’s hearing on regulatory burdens on small financial institutions. In financial services, as in every other sector, the United States is not a one-size-fits-all nation. Financial institutions of all different sizes coexist, and customers choose among them based upon their needs. A regulatory environment that is increasingly unwelcoming to small financial institutions may curtail customer choice.
We are ultimately advocating not for Bitcoin, but for innovation. It is important that policymakers allow this experimentation to continue. Policymakers should work to clarify how Bitcoin is regulated and to normalize its regulation so that we have the opportunity to learn just how innovative Bitcoin can be.
The report was prepared in order to assist the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) in “its analysis of whether—and how—to consider [asset management firms] for enhanced prudential standards and supervision.”2 A full response to the FSOC’s request would have included an analysis of whether subjecting asset management firms to enhanced prudential standards and supervision would undermine financial stability—an issue that was not addressed in the OFR report.
The F. A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics and Economics at the Mercatus Center hosted a panel discussion featuring Benjamin Powell and his new book, Out of Poverty: Sweatshops in the Global Economy.
The Mercatus Center at George Mason University invites you to join Todd Zywicki, Senior Scholar and Senior Fellow with the F.A. Hayek Program at the Mercatus Center and Ted Gayer, Vice President and Director of the Economic Studies program at the Brookings Institution for a Regulation University program that examines the mistakes agencies make in developing “nudge” regulations and the unintended, but foreseeable, consequences of those mistakes.
Please join us for a casual reception where you can take a break from March Madness and meet some of our scholars who can provide the kind of practical information you need to be most effective in your work.
This book provides a comprehensive defense of third-world sweatshops. It explains how these sweatshops provide the best available opportunity to workers and how they play an important role in the process of development that eventually leads to better wages and working conditions.