My name is John D. Graham, Dean of the Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs and former administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) of the Office of Management and Budget (2001–2006). In my capacity as editor of an article series organized by the Mercatus Center at George Mason University and published in volume 37, issue 2 of the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, I submit the attached articles as my written testimony for the Executive Overreach Task Force’s hearing on May 24, 2016, entitled “The Federal Government on Autopilot: Delegation of Regulatory Authority to an Unaccountable Bureaucracy.”…
The recent rise of “FinTech”—the use of technology to provide financial services in innovative ways—has the potential to significantly change how consumers access financial services. These changes are pressuring existing regulatory structures and norms, and they are creating concern that regulators will hamper needed modernization or fail to prevent a harmful destabilization of the financial system. I commend the OCC for acknowledging that its existing model for regulation could be improved to better match the needs of the current market and for providing an initial framework for how it plans to address innovation within its jurisdiction.
The case examined here is the package of regulations that met the initial legal requirements provided by the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (NLEA, Public Law 101-535). This act gave the FDA the authority to require nutrition labeling of most foods regulated by the Agency and to require that all nutrient content claims (e.g., “high fiber” or “low fat”) and health claims be consistent with agency regulations.
Today I will comment on “wasteful and duplicative spending,” and discuss how better, more transparent budget processes are the first step, but not the solution, to controlling such spending. I would like to make three main points. First, changing the focus to the desired outcomes in the budget process is essential to controlling duplicative spending. Second, comparing the results of all activities that impact the same outcome is critical in allocating resources to the most effective activities and maximizing outcome achievement. And third, budget procedures matter when it comes to controlling spending, based on evidence from state governments and overseas.
The OECD hopes that the new reporting standards will provide tax administrators with useful information to more effectively direct auditors while making it easier to identify artificial profit shifting to tax-advantaged environments. This public comment will argue that the accounting costs of country-by-country reporting will be larger than the Department of the Treasury’s revenue gains and that there will be even higher unanticipated costs from inadvertent disclosures of sensitive information. Because the costs of information centralization will be greater than the benefits, we recommend that the IRS should not implement the proposed regulation on country-by-country reporting. This recommendation is informed by a recent paper from the Mercatus Center at George Mason University that explains key features of the international corporate tax system, the changes the OECD wants to make, and the potentially far-reaching consequences of those changes. The study also provides recommendations to improve corporate taxation without compromising state sovereignty or taxpayer rights.
My testimony focuses on two key issues. First, I will explain how the current-law Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) is overly complex and unfair. Second, I will discuss how reforming the Social Security benefit formula would improve the simplicity and fairness of the WEP, while still maintaining the original public policy purpose. Additionally, though most of my testimony focuses on the WEP, a related provision, the Government Pension Offset (GPO), has similar complexity and fairness problems that should be addressed.
Ill-considered regulation regarding algorithmic trading will adversely affect the ability of legitimate market participants to contribute to liquidity, price discovery, narrow spreads, and low trading costs. The CFTC shares with market participants a growing interest in algorithmic trading and its potential effects on the markets. Rather than working with market participants cooperatively, the Commission proposes a prescriptive regime applicable to virtually any firm that trades in the futures (and swaps) markets. If finalized, this proposal will establish an approach dominated by enforcement that will chill firms’ willingness to work with the Commission to address emerging problems in the area. In addition, by opening firms’ source code to unlimited inspection by the Commission and others, the proposal creates dangerous vulnerabilities for an asset of utmost importance to trading firms.
Whatever the justification behind licensing in the past, its rationale is disappearing as technology provides new solutions to old problems. This meeting is an opportunity for policymakers to reevaluate traditional regulations aimed at addressing information deficiencies and allow technological innovation to do what regulation could not: improve consumer welfare while encouraging innovation and economic growth.
This small agency, established in 1980 by President Carter to “regulate the regulators” and to give “OMB final word on many of the regulations issued by our government,” has largely failed to achieve either goal. The myth persists that OIRA is a “little-known but extraordinarily powerful” agency that has been a “bottleneck” for protective regulations. The data, however, simply do not support this notion.
Chairman Shelby, Ranking Member Brown, and Members of the Committee, I am honored to appear before you today as one of the President’s nominees to serve as a member of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. It is a particular privilege to be considered for the SEC together with Professor Lisa Fairfax.
Information, investment and innovation are the engines of economic growth in the 21st century. Yet regulatory accumulation and outdated regulatory processes are preventing both the private and public sectors from effectively using the three “I’s” to solve problems and grow the economy.
In the first half of 2016, the US economy skirted close to recession territory but so far has registered positive growth. What are the major forces that seem to be driving the slow-growth economy? Is the economy getting stronger? Or, will we hit recession territory before the end of the year?
Join us for a discussion with Mercatus Research Fellow Christopher Koopman, who will explain the greatest threats to capitalism today and what reforms could put us on the path to the next Industrial Revolution.
In this book, Adam Thierer argues that if the former disposition, “the precautionary principle,” trumps the latter, “permissionless innovation,” the result will be fewer services, lower-quality goods, higher prices, diminished economic growth, and a decline in the overall standard of living.