Donald J. Boudreaux is Professor of Economics at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia. He was the Chairman of the Department of Economics from August 2001 to August 2009. Previously, he was president of the Foundation for Economic Education (1997-2001); Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Economics at Clemson University (1992-1997); and Assistant Professor of Economics at George Mason University (1985-1989).

Tyler Cowen is the general director of Mercatus and the Holbert C. Harris Professor of Economics at George Mason University. Tyler is the author of numerous books, articles, and newspaper columns and co-writes a daily blog at www.marginalrevolution.com.

The financial crisis invalidated a naïve notion of “efficient markets,” but the most sophisticated version is still viable. Whereas the invalidated version holds that markets never err and always adjust instantaneously, the sophisticated version, associated with the ideas of Adam Smith and F. A. Hayek, holds that markets mobilize individuals to realize gains from trade and to innovate and thereby produce generalized prosperity.

The Great Recession (or the Great Hangover) that began in 2008 did not have to happen. Its causes and consequences are not mysterious. Indeed, this particular and very painful episode affirms what the best nonpartisan economists have tried to tell our politicians and policy-makers for decades, namely, that the more they try to inflate and direct the economy, the more damage the rest of us will suffer sooner or later.

This paper looks at the roots of the current crisis through an analytical framework of bad bets, excessive leverage, domino effects, and 21st-century bank runs. It shows that broad policy areas—including housing policy, capital regulations for banks, industry structure and competition, autonomous financial innovation, and monetary policy—affected elements of this framework to varying, but important degrees. Ultimately, this special study seeks to draw meaningful lessons for policymakers by understanding the complex history, evolution, and integrated nature of financial regulations.

In light of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, policymakers are reforming financial regulations in order to create a resolution system for large failing financial institutions. This paper advocates that speed bankruptcy, specifically overnight debt-to-equity conversions be considered as a viable option to recapitalize troubled financial institutions. At the very least, overnight debt-to-equity conversions could have been used to provide hundreds of billions of dollars of extra equity to weak firms in 2008, and could still be used the next time a firm that is ostensibly “too big to fail” comes close to going bust.

In recent years, there has been growth in nontraditional lending products such as payday lending and auto title lending, and a relative decline of others, such as finance companies and pawnbrokers. Meanwhile, the onset of the financial crisis has spurred renewed scrutiny of nontraditional lending products, even though there is…

Widespread foreclosures and the collapse in home prices in many areas of the United States that began in 2007 and continued through 2008 and 2009, spawned an ongoing global financial crisis. As a result, the United States has engineered a series of unprecedented market interventions designed to stabilize the housing market and the financial markets dependent on mortgage-backed securities. However, standard economics provides a compelling explanation for much of the increase in household mortgage obligations. This working paper focuses on underlying questions related to consumer behavior and looks at the impact of these developments in the housing market on household financial condition.

Policymakers continue to seek viable alternatives to resolve large insolvent financial institutions. A better option is speed bankruptcy: a process of converting some long-term debt into equity, a more palatable option than using taxpayer funds to recapitalize large banks.

As part of a broad legislative effort to regulate hedge funds, Congress has introduced a bill that would require hedge funds to register with the SEC and comply with new record keeping and disclosure requirements. A much more effective method of regulating hedge funds would be to institute a strategy which effectively encourages markets to self-police by instituting financial regulatory policies that support self-regulation of hedge funds.

In the wake of the financial crisis, Congress is considering new regulations on non-traditional lending products like payday lending, although there is no evidence that such products were related in any way to the financial crisis. If enacted, the principal legislation, H.R. 1214 (the Payday Loan Reform Act of 2009), would limit the charge for a single-payment loan to an effective 391 percent annual rate ($15 per $100 two-week loan). H.R. 1214 also purports to limit borrowers to one loan at a time from a single lender, prohibit rollovers, and limit borrowers to one extended repayment plan every six months. Economic theory and empirical evidence strongly suggests that these paternalistic regulations would make consumers worse off by limiting their choices to unappealing alternatives.

In his testimony before the Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress, Lillian F. Smith Distinguished Scholar Dr. Russell Roberts explains what Congress can do to create jobs during the recovery period. Dr. Roberts also points out the many things Congress must stop doing in order to let the economy heal.

In this testimony, Professor Russell Roberts explains that the problem with executive compensation is that executives have not been subject to the profit and loss cosequences of the free-market system. Profits encourage risk-taking, and the losses encourage prudence. If the government would resist bailouts and allow these incentives to be…

In this congressional testimony, Professor White argues that the best way approach to reining in credit rating agencies is not more regulation, but rather ending regulatory reliance on their ratings.