Noel D. Johnson

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Noel D. Johnson

  • Research Fellow
  • Assistant Professor of Economics, George Mason University

Noel Johnson is a research fellow at the Mercatus Center and an assistant professor of economics at George Mason University. His research focuses on the historical origins of modern economic growth. He is interested in how current political and cultural institutions have evolved and whether they impede or facilitate economic success.

Dr. Johnson went to graduate school at Washington University in St. Louis.

Published Research

Does Fortune Favor Dragons?

John Nye, Noel D. Johnson | Jan 2012
Why do seemingly irrational superstitions persist? In this journal article, the authors analyze the widely held belief among Asians that children born in the Year of the dragon are superior.

War! What is it Good For?

Noel D. Johnson, Steven Yamarik, Ryan A. Compton | Sep 24, 2010
This paper examines the long-run impact of interstate conflict on real GDP per capita for a cross section of countries between 1960 and 2000.

Investing in Institutions

Ryan A. Compton, Daniel Giedeman, Noel D. Johnson | Aug 30, 2010
Robust institutional change is difficult to achieve. However, the growth paths of some countries are more likely to be affected by contemporaneous political turmoil than others. This paper supports…

Corruption is Bad for Growth (Even in the United States)

Noel D. Johnson, Courtney L. LaFountain and Steven Yamarik | Aug 30, 2010
This paper estimates the impact of corruption on growth of output per worker in U.S. states. The authors find that corruption plays a significant and causal role in lowering growth and investment…
More Published Research

Working Papers

Taxes, Lawyers, and the Decline of Witch Trials in France

Mark Koyama, Noel D. Johnson | Oct 21, 2011
This paper explores the rise of the fiscal state in the early modern period and its impact on legal capacity. To measure legal capacity, we establish that witchcraft trials were more likely to take place where the central state had weak legal institutions. Further historical evidence supports our hypothesis that higher taxes led to better legal institutions.

Pick Your Poison: Do Politicians Regulate When They Can't Spend?

Noel D. Johnson, Matthew Mitchell, Steven Yamarik | Jun 28, 2011
In this paper, the authors investigate whether laws restricting fiscal policies across U.S. states lead politicians to regulate more instead.

Trade, Taxes, and Terroir

Noel D. Johnson, John Nye, Raphael Franck | Jul 06, 2010
This paper uses data on the wine market in France at the turn of the twentieth century to argue that excise taxes collected on quantity can also be protectionist. High internal tax rates generated…

Investing in Institutions

Ryan A. Compton, Daniel Giedeman, Noel D. Johnson | Oct 2009
Robust institutional change is difficult to achieve.  However, the growth paths of some countries are more likely to be affected by contemporaneous political turmoil than others.  This paper supports…
More Working Papers

Media Clippings

A long ago beneficiary of tax hikes? The ‘witches’ of France

Noel D. Johnson, Mark Koyama | Nov 11, 2011
Outlet: The Washington Post

How austerity leads to more regulation

Matthew Mitchell, Noel D. Johnson, Steven Yamarik | Aug 03, 2011
Outlet: Washington Post