Publications by Peter Leeson

Working Paper

Efficient Plunder

Peter Leeson | Jul 09, 2010
Self-interest seeking leads stronger individuals to plunder weaker ones. But could it also lead them to do so in ways that minimize plunder’s social inefficiency? This paper argues that when contracts between enemies are enforceable and transaction costs are low, plunderers and their victims benefit from trade that facilitates the former’s ability to plunder the latter.
Working Paper

Trial by Battle

Peter Leeson | Jul 09, 2010
For over a century England's judicial system decided land disputes by ordering disputants' legal representatives to bludgeon one another before an arena of spectating citizens. People called these combats trials by battle. This paper investigates the law and economics of trial by battle. In a feudal world where high transaction costs confounded the Coase theorem, this paper argues that trial by battle allocated disputed property rights efficiently.
Working Paper

Ordeals

Peter Leeson | Apr 06, 2010
For 400 years the most sophisticated persons in Europe decided difficult criminal cases by putting the defendants through ordeals. I argue that ordeals accurately assigned accused criminals guilt and innocence. They did this by leveraging a medieval superstition called iudicium Dei. According to this superstition, God condemned the guilty and exonerated the innocent through clergy conducted physical tests.
Working Paper

Contagious Capitalism

Peter Leeson | Mar 31, 2010
This paper asks whether capitalism is "contagious" and, if it is, whether it spreads more strongly or weakly than democracy. It finds that capitalism spreads more strongly than democracy but that its spread rate is similar.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Rational Choice, Round Robin, and Rebellion

An institutional solution to the problems of revolution
Peter Leeson | Mar 19, 2010
This paper argues that 18th-century merchant sailors who confronted the problems of collective action devised a novel institution to facilitate maritime revolution and assist them in overthrowing abusive captains. This institution was called a “Round Robin.”
Working Paper

Two Cheers for Capitalism?

Peter Leeson | Feb 18, 2010
According to a popular view the author terms “two cheers for capitalism,” capitalism’s effect on development is ambiguous and mixed. This paper empirically investigates that view and finds that it’s wrong.
Working Paper

The Political Economy of FEMA: Did Reorganization Matter?

This paper investigates the political economy of FEMA’s post-9/11 merger with the Department of Homeland Security.
Book

Media, Development, and Institutional Change

Media, Development, and Institutional Change investigates mass media’s profound ability to affect institutional change and economic development. The authors use the tools of economics to illuminate the media’s role in enabling and inhibiting political-economic reforms that promote development.
Journal Article

Two-Tiered Entrepreneurship and Economic Development

Peter J. Boettke, Peter Leeson | Sep 01, 2009
This paper argues that there are two tiers of entrepreneurship important for economic development. One is concerned with investments in productive technologies that improve productivity and better service consumer needs. The other is concerned with the creation of protective technologies that secure citizens’ private property rights vis-à-vis one another.
Journal Article

What 'Human Action' Has Meant to Me: Reflections of a Young Economist

Peter Leeson | Sep 01, 2009
Peter Leeson reminisces on the influence Human Action had on his scholarly career and research agenda.