In this paper, Boettke, Coyne, and Leeson provide three cases where the scientistic pretensions of economists got the better of them in the 20th century: Keynesian demand management, the practice of cost/benefit analysis by regulators and lawyers, and the debate over market socialism.
The absence of an effective enforcement mechanism for punishing politicians who cater to special interests gives political agents strong reason to doubt the commitment of their fellowstatesmen to the public welfare. Political agent benevolence is thus an all-or-nothing proposition. Unless benevolence is total, policy looks the same.
This paper contends that economic principles have been excluded from the debate about who should provide cyber security. This paper seeks to fill this gap. We postulate that an analysis of cyber security in the absence of economic considerations is incomplete. Toward this end, we employ several economic concepts in order to offer insight to policymakers involved in this debate.
Self-enforcing arrangements are crucial to the study of African political economy. The weakness of formal governance in much of Africa makes understanding informal institutions of cooperation particularly important. I consider the application of self-enforcing arrangements, like those described by the Ostroms, to the problems of violence and social heterogeneity that plague Africa.