Andrew P. Morriss is a senior scholar at the Mercatus Center and the H. Ross & Helen Workman Professor of Law and Business at the University of Illinois. His research interests include: banking law, offshore banking, legal history, consumer payment systems, regulatory economics, and administrative law.

This Policy Primer examines the origins and validity of the food miles concept.

Highlights Our Findings The 1998 Master Settlement Agreement ("MSA") among the major U.S. cigarette companies, 46 state attorneys general, and private plaintiffs' attorneys represented the culmination of decades of tobacco regulation that came about through coalitions between tobacco company "bootleggers" and health interest group "Baptists." Where transaction costs are low enough, bootleggers and Baptists can grease government machinery to produce regulation. But bootleggers' economic interest and Baptists' ostensibly public interest often conflict. This conflict raises transaction costs and leaves untapped political gains that might be achieved by a more efficient alliance led by a political broker - a "televangelist" - who can deal effectively with the major parties.

The bootleggers and Baptists public choice theory of regulation explains how durable regulatory bargains can arise from the tacit collaboration of a public-interest-minded interest group (the Baptists) with an economic interest (the bootleggers). Using the history of tobacco regulation, this Article extends the bootleggers and Baptists theory of regulation to incorporate the role of policy entrepreneurs like the state attorneys general and private trial lawyers who joined forces to regulate tobacco by litigation. We denominate these actors televangelists and demonstrate that they play a pernicious role in regulation.

Tyler Cowen discusses what we should consider in the event of an avian flu pandemic.

In a March 2009 address, President Obama declared, “There are certain things only a government can do. And one of those things is ensuring that the foods we eat . . . are safe and don’t cause us harm.” Though this idea that only the government can control food safety risk may have been true at the turn of the 20th century, since then three important changes have occurred.

In this Mercatus on Policy, Richard Williams and Katelyn Christ of the Mercatus Center discuss the dangers and shortfalls of excise taxes.

In this Public Interest Comment, Managing Director of the Regulatory Studies Program Richard Williams suggests that the benefit/risk approach is the best method to assess the risk of methyl mercury in commercial fish.

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is preparing to create a report on food industry marketing activities and expenditures targeted to children and adolescents. The report is meant to analyze the role of advertising and marketing efforts in the increased incidence of childhood obesity.

Jerry Ellig presents before the Department of Energy, Office of Health, Safety and Security in the Visiting Speakers Program about regulation in high reliability organizations, such as telecommunications, airport security and finance.