This paper looks at the roots of the current crisis through an analytical framework of bad bets, excessive leverage, domino effects, and 21st-century bank runs. It shows that broad policy areas—including housing policy, capital regulations for banks, industry structure and competition, autonomous financial innovation, and monetary policy—affected elements of this framework to varying, but important degrees. Ultimately, this special study seeks to draw meaningful lessons for policymakers by understanding the complex history, evolution, and integrated nature of financial regulations.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) seeks to increase investors' access to foreign markets by negotiating bilateral agreements with foreign regulators pursuant to a policy known as "mutual recognition." Under mutual recognition, a foreign entity seeking to access U.S. capital markets would be permitted to substitute compliance with its home country's regulations for compliance with U.S. regulation, as long as it agrees to submit to SEC antifraud jurisdiction in its dealings with U.S. investors. Similarly, U.S. entities could enter foreign markets without subjecting themselves to a second layer of regulation on top of what the SEC already requires. This article suggests that the best way for the SEC to pursue mutual recognition is to recognize foreign securities regimes that achieve investor protection outcomes comparable to those achieved by the SEC, and provides a concrete and workable approach for the SEC to follow.

The recent financial crisis has provoked a raft of contending claims as to whether the cause of the crisis is better attributed to market failure or political failure. Such claims are predicated on a presumption that markets and polities are meaningfully separate entities. To the contrary, we argue that contemporary…

There has been a rising academic debate on the sustainability of deficit spending and accumulated debt in governments across the globe. This correlates with a growing concern that excessive government deficits and accumulated debt will lead to unstable financial environments and a devalued quality of life for future generations. Varying economies with varying fiscal behavior have increased incentives to work toward more responsible fiscal behavior through reining in deficit spending and debt accumulation. We seek to understand the process these economies undertook, the procedures they used, and the resulting effectiveness of those procedures on achieving fiscal stability.

This chart compares the changes in public and private sector employment which have occurred during the past two years.

Using data from the Obama administration’s website Recovery.gov and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, this chart shows the month-over-month changes in the number of unemployed workers and members of the civilian labor force in tandem with the administration’s stimulus spending.

In a March 2009 address, President Obama declared, “There are certain things only a government can do. And one of those things is ensuring that the foods we eat . . . are safe and don’t cause us harm.” Though this idea that only the government can control food safety risk may have been true at the turn of the 20th century, since then three important changes have occurred.

With record spending and deficits come calls for reform. Entrenched political problems, however, make spending reform easier said than done. Independent commissions are often suggested as a way to tackle intractable political problems, but not all congressionally created commissions are the same. The Base Realignment and Closing (BRAC) commissions of the late ’80s and early ’90s were remarkably successful because of their peculiar structures, not simply because they were commissions.

During the financial crisis of 2008, the federal government used taxpayer funds through the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) to buy shares in private firms. In his testimony, Prof. J.W. Verret speaks to the possibility of how government ownership of private firms can pervert the accountability of both government and business.

In his testimony before the Tennessee Joint Study Committee on Wine in Grocery Stores, Senior Research Fellow Jerry Ellig argues that restrictions ought not be imposed on competition unless the restrictions accomplish some clear public purpose. Furthermore, the restriction should be no more severe than necessary to accomplish the public purpose, for this helps ensure that the government accomplishes its policy goal at the lowest possible cost to consumers.

Jerry Ellig participated in panel discussion before Texas policy makers in Austin, Texas at the Texas Public Policy Foundation's Policy Orientation on the future of the Texas Public Utility Commission and competition policy in electric and telecommunications markets.

Jerry Ellig was invited to give a lecture at Pepperdine University about the future of regulations in the federal government.