Sherzod Abdukadirov

Sherzod Abdukadirov

  • Research Fellow

Sherzod Abdukadirov is a research fellow in the Regulatory Studies Program at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. He specializes in the federal regulatory process, institutional reforms, food and health, and social complexity.

Abdukadirov has prepared numerous policy briefs on regulatory issues, has written for US News & World Report, and also for scholarly journals such as Regulation, Constitutional Political Economy, and Asian Journal of Political Science.

Abdukadirov received his PhD in public policy from George Mason University and his BS in information technology from Rochester Institute of Technology.

Published Research

Working Papers

Sherzod Abdukadirov | Apr 28, 2015
This paper argues that health advocates are too quick to blame consumers for the ineffectiveness of information disclosure policies. Using the NFP as an example, the paper shows that information disclosures are often poorly designed and fail to actually inform consumers. They often fail to account for how consumers perceive and interpret information or for the differences in their socioeconomic backgrounds. Thus, it may not be consumers’ behavioral biases but rather poor policy design and implementation that is responsible for the NFP’s ineffectiveness. Consequently, the paper argues that nutrition labels should follow smart disclosure principles, which emphasize information salience and usability.
Sherzod Abdukadirov | May 29, 2014
Over the decades, regulatory reforms have sought to increase agency accountability and improve the quality of regulatory analysis and decision-making, with varying success. In this paper, I draw upon previous reform experiences to identify four criteria for effective reforms.
Sherzod Abdukadirov | Dec 18, 2012
This study attempts to shed some light on whether the benefits claimed by the federal agencies are likely to be achieved. In contrast to other validation studies, the study focuses on the agencies’ benefit claims rather than the actually measured benefits. Since agencies justify their regulatory decisions based on expected benefits, examining the quality of these claims is important.
Sherzod Abdukadirov | Nov 08, 2012
This paper examines whether political motivation plays a role in the timing of some midnight regulations. It further examines whether political motivation has a negative impact on the analytical quality of midnight regulations. In contrast to other studies that focus on the overall regulatory activity using proxies, this paper concentrates on a detailed analysis of three regulations issued in the final days of the Bush administration.


Policy Briefs

Testimony & Comments

Research Summaries & Toolkits

Media Clippings

Expert Commentary

Apr 04, 2016

In a nail-biting twist in the most recent confrontation between the New York City administration and city restaurants, the New York Court of Appeals put a last minute hold on the administration's new rule requiring high sodium warnings on food in restaurant chains.
Mar 14, 2016

Problems resulting from bad consumer choices can be substantial, but regulators' ability to help is dubious. Given their incentives, regulators are more likely to use behavioral sciences to justify more stringent and intrusive regulations that serve a political agenda, not consumers' needs.
Feb 17, 2016

In the latest attempt to counter the growing obesity epidemic, San Francisco supervisor Mark Farrell introduced legislation imposing restrictions on vending machines in order to push the city residents towards healthier diets. Here are two reasons ton doubt the measure's effectiveness.
Jan 13, 2016

The last-minute rush to regulate undermines the transparency and accountability of the regulatory process. It also results in less effective regulations. To address the problem, some congressional lawmakers suggested a moratorium on regulations during the midnight period. Yet, an all-out freeze on regulations may be needlessly disruptive. In addition, it may simply shift the flood of regulations to preceding months. A more flexible approach, suggested by my colleagues at the Mercatus Center, would be to institute a cap on the number of regulations that can be issued within a specific timeframe. This approach will allow the regulatory agencies to carry out their responsibilities, but will not overload OIRA's and stakeholders' capacity for effective oversight.


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