Sherzod Abdukadirov

Research Fellow, Regulatory Studies Program

Sherzod Abdukadirov is a research fellow at the Regulatory Studies Program at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. His research interests include the federal regulatory process, institutional reforms and social complexity. His recent research has appeared in Regulation, Constitutional Political Economy, and Asian Journal of Political Science.

Dr. Abdukadirov earned his BS in information technology from Rochester Institute of Technology and his PhD in public policy from George Mason University.

Working Papers

Regulatory Benefits: Examining Agency Justification For New Regulations

Sherzod Abdukadirov | Dec 18, 2012

This study attempts to shed some light on whether the benefits claimed by the federal agencies are likely to be achieved. In contrast to other validation studies, the study focuses on the agencies’ benefit claims rather than the actually measured benefits. Since agencies justify their regulatory decisions based on expected benefits, examining the quality of these claims is important.

Regulating in the Dark: Examining Bush Midnight Regulations

Sherzod Abdukadirov | Nov 08, 2012

This paper examines whether political motivation plays a role in the timing of some midnight regulations. It further examines whether political motivation has a negative impact on the analytical quality of midnight regulations. In contrast to other studies that focus on the overall regulatory activity using proxies, this paper concentrates on a detailed analysis of three regulations issued in the final days of the Bush administration.

Fat Chance: An Analysis of Anti-Obesity Efforts

Michael L. Marlow, Sherzod Abdukadirov | Mar 01, 2012

This working paper analyzes the methods and outcomes of government efforts to control obesity rates.

Blueprint for Regulatory Reform

Richard Williams, Sherzod Abdukadirov | Feb 07, 2012

This paper proposes a cornerstone of foundational reforms on which to build comprehensive regulatory reform.

Charts

The Phenomenon of Midnight Regulations

Sherzod Abdukadirov | Aug 28, 2012

Compared with non-election years, the number of economically significant regulations submitted for OIRA review more than doubles during midnight periods when control of the White House switches to a different party. The surge is rarely accompanied by an increase in OIRA’s budget or staff. Thus, OIRA can be overwhelmed during midnight periods, resulting in rushed, flawed oversight.

Policy Briefs

Inflated Benefits in Agencies' Economic Analysis

Sherzod Abdukadirov, Deema Yazigi | Aug 21, 2012

Regulatory impact analyses can serve as an important tool. They are designed to help policymakers consider a proposed regulation’s potential impact on the economy as a whole, not simply the interests of those lobbying for that regu- lation. When federal agencies conduct such analyses, how- ever, they often fail to comply with requirements enunciated in executive orders from presidents of both political parties over the past few decades. As a result, agency estimates of benefits are often fragmentary and unreliable, leading to ineffective regulation and wasting of public resources.

Beware the Surge of Midnight Regulations

Sherzod Abdukadirov | Jul 17, 2012

Administrations face fewer political constraints during the midnight period and, thus, take the opportunity to impose their policy preferences. These rushed, politically motivated regulations have poor quality analysis and face less stringent oversight from OIRA. Stemming the surge of midnight regulations requires comprehensive reform to constrain agencies’ ability to issue too many regulations and improve OIRA’s ability to oversee regulatory quality during the midnight period.

Regulatory Analysis and Regulatory Reform

Jerry Ellig, Sherzod Abdukadirov | Nov 16, 2011

To see whether regulatory analysis laws and executive orders have had the desired effects, a research team from the Mercatus Center at George Mason University evaluated the quality and use of the regulatory analysis accompanying every economically significant regulation proposed by executive branch regulatory agencies in 2008 and 2009.

Research Summaries & Toolkits

Beware the Surge: "Midnight Regulations"

Sherzod Abdukadirov | Jun 25, 2012

In a series of studies, Mercatus Center scholars examined the phenomenon of “midnight regulations,” or regulations promulgated between a presidential election day and an inauguration day.

Can Washington 'Fix' America's Obesity Problem? Fat Chance

Michael L. Marlow, Sherzod Abdukadirov | Mar 01, 2012

Obesity is not the result of market failure. Americans do not lack the knowledge, rationale, or motivation to improve their health. Thus, pursuing regulations intended for a market failure will not solve the problem.

Blueprint for Regulatory Reform: First, Lay the Cornerstone

Richard Williams, Sherzod Abdukadirov | Feb 07, 2012

The United States’ regulatory system long has failed to consistently produce efficient, cost-effective regulations that deliver promised benefits. For decades, presidents and Congresses have attempted to fix the regulatory system through a series of statutes and executive orders aimed at increasing transparency and improving analysis. Yet the pattern of poor regulatory choices persists, suggesting the problems are not political but deeply embedded in the institutions themselves.

Media Clippings

Expert Commentary

Catfish Regulations: What’s the Catch?

The Daily Caller

By Sherzod Abdukadirov |

Aug 17, 2012

Among the many fights brewing over the 2012 Farm Bill, one is a debate over a seemingly small provision that would charge the Department of Agriculture (USDA) with catfish inspection to ensure food safety. At $14 million a year, the program’s costs are trivial compared to the rest of the bill, estimated at $957.7 billion. Nevertheless, it is worth asking what problem this program is trying to solve.