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Self-Enforcing Arrangements in African Political Economy
Originally published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Self-enforcing arrangements are crucial to the study of African political economy. The weakness of formal governance in much of Africa makes understanding informal institutions of cooperation particularly important. I consider the application of self-enforcing arrangements, like those described by the Ostroms, to the problems of violence and social heterogeneity that plague Africa.
Self-enforcing arrangements are crucial to the study of African political economy. The weakness of formal governance in much of Africa makes understanding informal institutions of cooperation particularly important. I consider the application of self-enforcing arrangements, like those described by the Ostroms, to the problems of violence and social heterogeneity that plague Africa.
Read the article at Science Direct.
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